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INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment has always been a topic of controversy in the
United States.  The debate about the death penalty, its value as a
way to permanently incapacitate society’s most dangerous
criminals and its effectiveness as a deterrent to violent crime, has
increased over the last three years.  This phenomenon is particu-
larly visible in New York State where, in 2004, the New York Court
of Appeals struck down the State’s death penalty statute as invalid
under the New York Constitution.1  Three years later, in People v.
Taylor,2 the Court reiterated its prohibition on the use of capital
punishment under the current statute and overturned the death
sentence of the last man on New York’s death row.3  New York’s
death row is now empty and the Capital Defender Office, estab-
lished in 1995 when the death penalty statute was enacted, has
closed.4  The de jure moratorium on state executions initiated by
1. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
2. 878 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 2007).
3. See Alan Feuer, Murderer’s Sentence Tossed Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at
B3.
4. See Marnie Eisenstadt, 10 Years Later:  Death Penalty on the Books, off the
Agenda, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 25, 2005, at A1; Joel Stashenko,
Capital Defender Readies to Shut Doors, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 2007, at col. 4 [hereinafter
Stashenko, Capital Defender]; Joel Stashenko, Court of Appeals to Hear Last Pending
Death Case:  Outcome Could Be Affected by Addition of Two New Judges, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 10, 2007, at S1 [hereinafter Stashenko, Court of Appeals].  The Capital Defender
Office is a state agency “established under New York State’s death penalty statute
and was given the statutory mandate of ensuring that defendants who cannot afford
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People v. LaValle will continue unless the state legislature amends
the death penalty statute to cure the constitutional defects identi-
fied by the Court of Appeals.
What is the future of capital punishment in New York? In 2008,
the question of whether the New York State Legislature will ad-
dress the LaValle and Taylor decisions by either amending or re-
pealing the death penalty statute remains unresolved.5  This Note
describes the evolution of New York’s 1995 death penalty statute,
analyzes the way in which the state legislature could respond to the
statute’s unconstitutionality, and recommends that the legislature
end the current debate over the future of capital punishment in
New York by abolishing the death penalty.
Part I describes the evolution of death penalty legislation at the
federal level and within New York State.  It focuses on the struc-
ture of New York’s death penalty, examines its statutory provi-
sions, and then explores the Court of Appeals’ reasons for
declaring the statute unconstitutional.  Part I further discusses the
legislative reaction to the statute’s invalidation and describes the
current debate in New York about the continued desirability of
capital punishment.  Part II presents the legislative alternatives of
either amending or abolishing New York’s death penalty statute
and discusses the arguments for and against each option.  Finally,
Part III argues that despite the challenges involved in either
amending and reinstating the death penalty or abolishing it, the
legislature should not allow the statute simply to remain inoperable
by default.  This Note concludes that given the need for action, the
State Legislature should move to abolish the death penalty in New
York.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF NEW YORK’S DEATH
PENALTY STATUTE
This Part examines the history and development of New York’s
death penalty statute:  first, introducing the requirements estab-
lished by the Supreme Court for a constitutional capital punish-
ment scheme; then, examining the structure of New York’s death
adequate representation in capital cases receive effective assistance of counsel.  The
statute also charged the CDO with creating an effective system of capital defense
throughout New York State.”  Capital Defender Office Website, http://www.nycdo.
org (last visited Sept. 25, 2008); see also THE CAPITAL DEFENDER OFFICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK STATE:  STATISTICS FROM EIGHT YEARS OF REPRESEN-
TATION 1995-2003 (2003), http://www.nycdo.org/8yr.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
5. See infra Part I.F.
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penalty statute in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence.  This Part
also reviews the New York Court of Appeals’ decision invalidating
the statute as violating the state constitution; and finally, describes
the legislative reaction to this de jure moratorium on capital pun-
ishment in New York.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Capital Punishment
The U.S. Supreme Court’s regulation of capital punishment be-
gan with the 1972 landmark case, Furman v. Georgia,6 in which the
Court found unfettered capital sentencing discretion unconstitu-
tional.  By failing to provide safeguards against arbitrary sentenc-
ing decisions, capital punishment statutes like Georgia’s violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 Furman invalidated all
death penalty statutes as they existed in the United States in 1972,
initiating a nationwide four-year moratorium on capital
punishment.
The moratorium ended in 1976 with Gregg v. Georgia,8 when the
Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s newly-enacted capital sentencing
scheme.9  Specifically, the Court found that the Georgia statute sat-
isfied the constitutional mandate identified in Furman:  to with-
stand Eighth Amendment scrutiny, a capital punishment statute
must provide “clear and objective” standards for determining
death-eligibility.10
Importantly, in Gregg, the Court expressly rejected the rigid cat-
egorization of death as cruel and unusual punishment.11  Prior to
Gregg, the Supreme Court had addressed the constitutionality of
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net:  Another Decade of Legislative
Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 & n.26
(2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959400; see also Michael J. Perry, Is Capi-
tal Punishment Unconstitutional?  And Even if We Think It Is, Should We Want the
Supreme Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV. 867, 896 n.78 (2007) (noting that the
Furman decision “effectively declared unconstitutional the death penalty statutes
then in place in 40 states and commuted the sentences of 629 death row inmates
around the country”).
8. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
9. See Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net, supra note 7. R
10. As the Court explained in Gregg, the Eighth Amendment requires procedural
safeguards to prevent against “arbitrary and capricious” decision-making. See Gregg,
428 U.S. at 189, 193; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes
to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and ap-
ply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty . . . . It must channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective stan-
dards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable
the process for imposing a sentence of death.”) (internal citations omitted).
11. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69.
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specific capital punishment regimes and had often “assumed and
asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment.”12  Not until
Gregg, however, did the Court explicitly state that the death pen-
alty “does not invariably violate the Constitution.”13  This clarifica-
tion was critical in reviving capital punishment nationwide.  In fact,
since 1972, thirty-seven states have reinstated the death penalty,14
crafting capital sentencing statutes to comply with the require-
ments articulated by the Supreme Court in Furman, Gregg, and
their progeny.15
Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has established
clear guidelines for state legislation of a legal and constitutional
death penalty regime.  In decisions following Furman, the Supreme
Court identified two features necessary for a constitutional capital
sentencing scheme:  first, a method to narrow the class of offenders
eligible for the death penalty,16 and second, an individualized sen-
tencing determination based on consideration of the particular de-
fendant’s character, record, and circumstances.17  Although state
death penalty statutes differ on certain points, each uses a two-step
process whereby the sentencer makes a factual determination of
12. Id. at 169.
13. Id.
14. The thirty-seven states that adopted death penalty statutes after 1972 were:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  There
has not been an execution in Kansas, New Hampshire, or New York since 1976. See
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (2007).  The New
Jersey death penalty was abolished in 2007. See infra note 170.
15. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (requiring individualized sentenc-
ing); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 (requiring guided discretion); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 400 (1972) (requiring narrowing of jury discretion); see also Jason M.
Schoenberg, Making the Constitutional Cut:  Evaluating New York’s Death Penalty
Statute in Light of the Supreme Court’s Capital Punishment Mandates, 8 J.L. & POL’Y
337, 342-43 (1999).
16. Statutory aggravating circumstances are used in many states, such as New
York, to guide sentencing discretion.  According to the Supreme Court, “an aggravat-
ing circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 877 (1983).
17. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (finding
mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional because sentencer was not allowed
to consider the defendant’s character and record).
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the defendant’s death-eligibility, followed by a discretionary deter-
mination of the appropriate punishment.18
B. New York’s 1995 Statute in Light of Supreme
Court Mandates
On March 7, 1995, New York State enacted a death penalty stat-
ute authorizing capital punishment for thirteen categories of inten-
tional murder.19  Capital trials in New York are conducted in two
stages.20  First, the jury must decide whether the defendant is guilty
of first degree murder.21  New York’s death penalty statute, section
400.27 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”),22 “nar-
rows” the class of death-eligible defendants by requiring that, in
the guilt phase of a capital trial, the jury find at least one statutory
aggravating factor established beyond a reasonable doubt.23  The
burden of proof rests with the government and the jury must agree
unanimously on each aggravating factor.24
After a defendant is convicted of first degree murder, the trial
court conducts a separate sentencing25 proceeding with the same
jury that determined the defendant’s guilt.26  The government may
seek a capital sentence only if it has filed timely notice of intent.27
18. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193.
19. New York’s death penalty statute went into effect on September 1, 1995. See
1995 N.Y. Sess. Laws 20.40 (McKinney); see also Andrea E. Girolamo, Punishment or
Politics? New York State’s Death Penalty, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 121 (1998) (citing
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney Supp. 1997)).  The New York statute authorizes
capital punishment for “thirteen categories of intentional murder, including murders
committed in furtherance of other crimes like robbery, rape or burglary.” JOSEPH
LENTOL ET AL., N.Y. ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMS. CODES, JUDICIARY, AND CORR.,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW YORK, 14 (2005), available at http://assem-
bly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf.
20. See Schoenberg, supra note 15, at 357-63. R
21. First degree murder is defined by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2003).
22. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2004).
23. See id. § 400.27(7)(b).  Aggravating factors are listed in N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney 2004).  The Supreme Court has approved “[t]he use of ‘ag-
gravating circumstances’ . . . [as] a means of . . . narrowing the class of death-eligible
persons.”  Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988).
24. See § 400.27(7)(b).
25. Also referred to as the “penalty phase.”
26. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney 2004). But see id.
§ 400.27(2) (listing exceptions to impaneling same jury).  A jury trial cannot be
waived in a New York capital case. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“A jury trial may be
waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged
may be punishable by death.”); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (McKin-
ney 1974).
27. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(2) (McKinney 1995).  The government
has limited time in which to seek a capital trial:  it must file a written notice of intent
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The government can withdraw this notice at any time.28  Individu-
alized sentencing is accomplished in New York capital cases
through the presentation and consideration of the mitigating cir-
cumstances of the crime and the individual character of the defen-
dant.29  In New York, capital sentencing authority rests with the
jury, who must choose to sentence a defendant convicted of first
degree murder to either death or life imprisonment without pa-
role.30  The jury makes this sentencing decision by weighing the ag-
gravating factors established in the trial’s guilt phase31 and the
mitigating factors that each juror finds that the defendant32
proved33 by a preponderance of the evidence.34
Furthermore, a death sentence may be imposed only if the jury
agrees unanimously that:  first, the aggravating factors “substan-
tially outweigh” the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt,35 and second, that death is the appropriate sentence.36  New
York affords a capital defendant additional protection by allowing
the jury to elect not to impose the death penalty even if the jury
finds that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the miti-
gating factors.37  If the jury’s sentencing resolution is unanimous,38
to seek the death penalty within 120 days of the defendant’s arraignment on an indict-
ment charging him with first-degree murder.
28. See § 400.27(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the peo-
ple at any time from determining that the death penalty shall not be sought in a par-
ticular case . . . .”).
29. See id. § 400.27(9) (listing mitigating factors for jurors to consider; subsection
(f) allows introduction of any potentially mitigating evidence); see also Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (“A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of
all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why
it should not be imposed. . . . [T]o meet the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to con-
sider mitigating circumstances.”).
30. § 400.27(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(5) (McKinney 2007) (“Life imprison-
ment without parole.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a defendant sen-
tenced to life imprisonment without parole shall not be or become eligible for parole
or conditional release.”).
31. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(3) (McKinney 2004).
32. At sentencing, the defendant may present evidence towards establishing the
existence of any mitigating factor he wishes the jury to consider. See § 400.27(9).
33. Each juror can decide for himself whether and which mitigating factors have
been established, regardless of what his fellow jurors find. See id. § 400.27(11).
34. See id. § 400.27(6); see also Girolamo supra note 19, at 122-23. R
35. See § 400.27(11)(a).
36. Id.
37. See id. § 470.30(3).
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the court must impose that decision.39  If the jury is unable to agree
on a sentence, however, the judge must impose a statutorily-dic-
tated sentence.40  All death sentences are subject to mandatory and
automatic direct review by the New York Court of Appeals.41  Any
sentence imposed “under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
any other arbitrary or legally impermissible factor” will be
overturned.42
C. The Jury’s Role In New York Capital Trials
The importance of fairness and reliability in New York’s capital
sentencing scheme is perhaps best seen in the role of the jury.
States vary in the degree of responsibility they allocate to the judge
and jury in capital cases.43  New York is among the majority of
death penalty states who vest capital sentencing authority in the
jury.44  In fact, in New York capital cases a jury trial is mandatory
and the jury makes both the factual45 and evaluative46
determinations.47
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that jury sentenc-
ing in a capital case is not constitutionally required,48 the Court has
conceded the “important societal function” of jury verdicts.49
Namely, the jury verdict provides a “significant and reliable objec-
38. See id. § 470.27(11).  The jury must submit to the court a written report with its
sentencing determination, the mitigating factors each juror found established, and all
mitigating and aggravating factors considered in deliberations. See id.
§ 400.27(11)(b); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 218.2 (2008).
39. See N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 470.27(11)(d) (McKinney 2004) (stating that if a
jury finds unanimously for death, the court shall impose the death penalty); id.
§ 470.27(11)(e) (McKinney 2004) (stating that if a jury finds unanimously for life im-
prisonment without the possibility of parole, the court shall impose that sentence).
But see id. § 330 (describing the circumstances in which the court may set aside a
death sentence).
40. See id. § 400.27(11)(c).
41. See id. § 450.70(1).
42. Id. § 470.30(3)(a).
43. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters:  An Empirical
Examination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty
Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2006).
44. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002).
45. By finding aggravating factors in the guilt phase.
46. By finding mitigating circumstances in the penalty phase.
47. In New York, the “criminal jury is more than a finder of fact; it is a microcosm
of democratic government.”  Matthew Tulchin, An Analysis of the Development of the
Jury’s Role in a New York Criminal Trial, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 425, 490 (2005).
48. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976).
49. Id.
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tive index of contemporary values”50 and reflects the “conscience
of the community.”51  The provisions of New York’s 1995 statute
mandating jury sentencing in capital cases52 and further condition-
ing a death sentence on unanimous jury approval53 underscore the
New York capital jury’s important role as the ultimate arbiter of
death.54
D. The Anticipatory Deadlock Provision
To further the goal of reliable jury verdicts in capital cases, the
New York statute provides additional due process protections
through enhanced sentencing information.  New York is one of
only eight states55 to require that before a capital jury begins sen-
tencing deliberations the trial court must instruct the jury on the
consequences of deadlock.56
According to the Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment does
not require a jury instruction on the consequences of deadlock.57
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976).  “Indeed, the decision that capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the
community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to hu-
manity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.” Id. at 184.
51. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); see also Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndividual sentencing juries
are, by design, better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the complex
societal and moral considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable
criminal punishments.”).
52. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“A jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all
criminal cases, except those in which the crime charged may be punishable by
death.”); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10(1) (McKinney 1974).
53. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(11)(a).
54. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (“[I]n a capital sentencing
proceeding, the Government has ‘a strong interest in having the jury express the con-
science of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’”  (quoting
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988))).
55. Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367, 377 nn.4-5 (N.Y. 2004).  In
Delaware and Louisiana this requirement resulted from a judicial ruling. See Whalen
v. State, 492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985); State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619 (La. 1980).  In
Idaho, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, this instruction was a legisla-
tive requirement. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(7) (2004); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.030(4)(4) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(2)(a) (2004); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2004).
56. See Randi Schwartz, New York State Constitutional Decisions: 2004 Compila-
tion: Due Process:  Court of Appeals of New York: People v. LaValle, 21 TOURO L.
REV. 30 (2005) (discussing the rationale behind states’ requirement of anticipatory
deadlock instruction).
57. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-82 (1999).  “We have never sug-
gested, for example, that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury be instructed as to
the consequences of a breakdown in the deliberative process. On the contrary, we
have long been of the view that ‘[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure
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The New York Court of Appeals, however, has rejected this federal
construction as a matter of state constitutional law,58 finding it “un-
faithful” to the “heightened standard of reliability” required by the
due process clause of the New York Constitution.59  As the Su-
preme Court has itself observed, the finality of a death sentence
renders such punishment “qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long.”60  New York’s practice of provid-
ing capital jurors with all information relevant to the sentencing
process61 is based on the “qualitative difference” of a death sen-
tence and the consequent need for reliable sentencing decisions.62
New York’s anticipatory deadlock instruction,63 however, is
unique.64  New York trial courts must inform capital jurors that if
the jury is unable to reach a unanimous sentencing decision, the
court will impose a sentence of life imprisonment, with the possibil-
ity of parole after the defendant has served a minimum of twenty
to twenty-five years.65  This outcome, where jury deadlock results
in a sentence more lenient than either sentence available for jury
consideration, does not exist in any other states’ anticipatory dead-
lock scheme.66  In fact, in 2004 the New York Court of Appeals
identified this unique deadlock instruction as a flaw in New York’s
death penalty statute.67
unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors them-
selves.’” Id. at 382 (quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)); see also
Laurie B. Berberich, Jury Instructions Regarding Deadlock in Capital Sentencing, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1301, 1311-16 (2001).
58. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 364-65 (N.Y. 2004).  “[O]ur Due Pro-
cess Clause requires that jurors be informed of the consequences of their actions.”
People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 977 (N.Y. 2007).
59. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365.
60. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
61. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) (finding “it desirable for the
jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing
decision”); LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365.
62. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 983 (citing LaValle, 817
N.E.2d at 366) (recognizing the “irrevokable [sic] nature of capital punishment as well
as ‘the concomitant need for greater certainty in the outcome of capital jury
sentences’”).
63. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney 2004).
64. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 357.
65. § 400.27(10).
66. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 357; Berberich, supra note 57, at 1327-28; see also R
§ 400.27(10).
67. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 357.
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E. New York’s Death Penalty Found Unconstitutional
1. People v. LaValle
In 1997, Stephen LaValle raped and stabbed a Suffolk County
school teacher to death with a screwdriver.68  A jury found LaValle
guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.69  On re-
view, in a four-to-three decision,70 the New York Court of Appeals
upheld LaValle’s conviction but vacated his death sentence.71  The
court held that section 400.27(10)’s deadlock instruction violates
the New York Constitution’s due process clause.72  By informing
jurors that failure to reach unanimous agreement will result in the
defendant’s release from prison in as little as twenty years, the an-
ticipatory deadlock instruction forces jurors to factor the defen-
dant’s future dangerousness into their sentencing decision.73
Future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravating factor for a
capital jury to consider under New York penal law.74  Section
400.27(10) therefore creates “an unconstitutionally palpable risk”
that a member of a potentially-deadlocked jury, who would other-
wise vote for life without parole, will vote for death, not because of
an individualized determination that the prisoner deserves death,75
but to prevent the defendant from receiving a parole-eligible dead-
lock sentence.76
The LaValle court declared that in order for New York’s capital
punishment statute to be functional, the State Legislature must en-
68. See Stashenko, supra note 4. R
69. See Paul Shechtman, A Term with Constitutional Proportions, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
7, 2004, at S5.
70. The four majority votes were those of Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, and Judges
George Bundy Smith, Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, and Albert Rosenblatt.  Judges
Robert S. Smith, Victoria A. Graffeo, and Susan Phillips Read dissented, charging the
majority with creating new rights for the defendant as a means of obstructing the
death penalty. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 369.
71. LaValle is currently serving a sentence of life without parole.  Stashenko,
supra note 4. R
72. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law.”).
73. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 361; see, e.g., John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerous-
ness in Capital Cases:  Always “At Issue”, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2001); William J.
Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default:  An Empirical Demonstration of
False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999).
74. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney 2003) (listing statutory aggravat-
ing factors); see also LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 at 357-58.
75. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 at 359 (“Under New York’s deadlock instruction
the choice [of a juror in deciding between death or life without the possibility of pa-
role] is not, as it should be, the result of a reasoned understanding that it was the
appropriate one.”).
76. Id. at 358.
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act amending legislation.77  Until such amendment, all first-degree
murder prosecutions must proceed as non-capital cases.78  Capital
punishment is effectively on hold in New York pending legislative
action to amend or repeal the statute.
2. People v. Taylor
Despite the New York Court of Appeals’s 2004 decision invali-
dating New York’s death penalty, in 2007, one man, John Taylor,
remained on New York’s death row.79  On May 24, 2000, Taylor
and accomplice Craig Godineaux robbed a Wendy’s restaurant in
Queens, New York.80  They shot five people to death and injured
two more.81  Taylor was held personally responsible for killing two
of the victims and liable for the deaths of the three others whom he
ordered his accomplice to kill.82  The jury convicted Taylor of
twenty counts of murder, including six counts of first degree
murder.83
Before jury selection, Taylor moved to strike his death penalty
notice, arguing that New York’s death penalty statute84 was uncon-
stitutional because the deadlock instruction deprived him of due
process.85  The trial judge, Steven W. Fisher, denied the motion,
citing Taylor’s failure to overcome beyond a reasonable doubt the
presumptive validity of a legislative statute.86  Fisher also refused
to instruct the jury that upon deadlock he would sentence Taylor to
175 years with no possibility of release from prison.87  Judge Fisher
did, however, modify the deadlock instruction by adding to the jury
charge:
[T]he six [counts] of first degree murder, and the two counts of
first degree attempted murder on which you have convicted the
77. Id. at 367.
78. Id.
79. Feuer, supra note 3. R
80. See People v. Taylor, 747 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
81. Id.; see also Michelle O’Donnell, Death Row Case May Decide More than an
Inmate’s Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1.
82. Taylor, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 320.  On January 22, 2001, Godineaux pleaded guilty to
each count of the indictment in which he was named, and on February 21, 2001, he
was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 320 n.2.
83. See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 973-74 (N.Y. 2007).
84. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2004).
85. People v. Taylor, No. 50367, slip. op., 2002 WL 31064487, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2002); see also Tom Perrotta, Defense Asks Court to Separate Issues in Taylor
Appeal, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 2006, at col. 3.
86. Taylor, 2002 WL 31064487, at *1.
87. See Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 974.
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defendant, are precisely the type of crimes that almost always in-
duce a judge to give the maximum sentence permissible.
. . . [T]he maximum sentence I could give and would almost
certainly impose in this case, would be a sentence of 175 years to
life . . . .88
The jury sentenced Taylor to death on three counts of first de-
gree murder and Taylor appealed his conviction and sentence.89
Taylor was the sixth and final death sentence under the 1995 stat-
ute heard by the Court of Appeals.90
Taylor submitted his appeal on the premise that any death sen-
tence based on the statute found unconstitutional in LaValle was
similarly defective.91  Prosecutors from the Queens County District
Attorney’s Office responded that the Court of Appeals could dis-
tinguish Taylor from LaValle because Judge Fisher’s jury charge
had cured the anticipatory deadlock instruction defect identified in
LaValle.92  Upholding Taylor’s death sentence, prosecutors argued,
would not overrule LaValle but rather “clarify” that the death pen-
alty statute is not unconstitutional as applied in all cases.93  The
prosecution asked the Court to admit that it had gone “too far” in
finding the statute’s deadlock provision unconstitutional and insev-
erable from the rest of the statute.94
On review, the Court of Appeals refused to “condone a trial
court’s remaking of an unconstitutional statute.”95  Although Tay-
lor’s death sentence pre-dated the LaValle decision, the statute
under which Taylor was sentenced had been determined facially
unconstitutional and non-severable.  Thus, the deadlock provision
was immune to judicial reformulation.96  The Court further ob-
served that the deadlock instruction given in Taylor created its own
problems of “non-neutrality” because the trial court injected its
opinion as to the weight of the mitigating circumstances into the
88. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 974.
90. See Joel Stashenko, Court Mulls Repercussions of Altering Death Ruling:  Kaye
Calls D.A.’S Claims of Error ‘Fighting Words’, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 2007, at S1.
91. See Perrotta, supra note 85; see also O’Donnell, supra note 81. R
92. See Robert Gavin, Case Stirs Death Debate:  Proceeding Headed for State’s
Highest Court Offers Possibility of Execution, TIMES UNION (Albany), Sept. 9, 2007, at
A1; Perrotta, supra note 85; see also O’Donnell, supra note 81. R
93. See Nicholas Confessore, New York’s High Court Hears Death Penalty Argu-
ments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at B3.
94. Id.
95. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 981 (N.Y. 2007).
96. See id. at 978.
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sentencing instruction.97  Judge Fisher’s instruction that the crimes
committed by Taylor were “precisely the type . . . [that] induce a
judge to give the maximum sentence permissible” signaled to the
jury that, in the judge’s personal opinion, the defendant merited no
leniency.98  By telling the jury that upon deadlock, he would proba-
bly impose a sentence of more than 175 years, Judge Fisher could
be interpreted as telling the jury “they too should give the maxi-
mum sentence permissible—death.”99  Members of a capital jury
who likely have never served on a trial, let alone a capital case, and
tend to lack legal training, will naturally be influenced by and defer
to what they perceive to be the judge’s expertise.  The Court of
Appeals noted that Judge Fisher’s instruction failed to present the
jury with the balanced and neutral sentencing information that is
particularly necessary when a defendant’s life is at stake.100
For these reasons, on October 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals
upheld People v. LaValle,101 reiterating LaValle’s central holding:
the current anticipatory deadlock provision of CPL section
400.27(10) is invalid under the New York State Constitution’s Due
Process Clause,102 and this unconstitutional provision cannot be
severed from the statute.103  The Court vacated Taylor’s death sen-
tence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.
97. See id. at 983 n.22.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See generally id. Taylor, like LaValle, was a four-to-three decision.  Judge Car-
men Beauchamp Ciparick, who authored the Taylor majority opinion and Chief Judge
Judith Kaye, reaffirmed their support for the LaValle decision.  They were joined by
Judge Theodore T. Jones, who was nominated by Governor Elliott Spitzer and re-
placed Judge George Bundy Smith in February 2007.  Judge Robert Smith, a dissenter
in LaValle, concurred with the Taylor decision on the principle of stare decisis.  The
two remaining dissenters from LaValle, Judges Susan Read and Victoria Graffeo, dis-
sented in Taylor, along with Eugene F. Pigott Jr., who was nominated by former-
Governor George Pataki and joined the Court in September 2006, replacing Albert
Rosenblatt. Both George Bundy Smith and Rosenblatt were members of the majority
in LaValle and majority voters in each of the Court of Appeals’ capital cases vacating
the death sentence. See New York Court of Appeals, Judges of the Court, available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/judges.htm.
102. See Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 976-78.
103. See id. at 977; see also id. at 982 (“In LaValle . . . the invalid portion of the
statute was inextricably interwoven with the sentencing procedure and necessary to
effectuate the Legislature’s intent. . . . [A]ny attempt to sever the offending portion of
the statute would result in a ‘misshapen fragment of the original’ drafted by a court’s
impermissible use of a legislative pen.”).
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Taylor has been resentenced to life imprisonment without
parole.104
F. Legislative Action Post-LaValle
Critics of the LaValle and Taylor decisions characterized the
Court of Appeals as intruding into the legislative realm of policy-
making.105  Specifically, they accused the Court of using these cases
to “advance a liberal agenda”106 and injecting into its decisions
“personal anti-death penalty ideologies.”107  Others said the Court
had properly confined itself to the task of legal interpretation, leav-
ing law-making to the legislature.108  In Taylor, the Court reiterated
LaValle’s message: the legislature can resurrect the death penalty
in New York through statutory amendment.109  Despite “reserva-
tions” as to the Court’s willingness to approve any amended ver-
sion of the death penalty,110 the senate resolved to “take corrective
action” in hopes of restoring the death penalty in New York.111
Accordingly, in 2004112 and again in 2005,113 the State Senate,
conceding the defeat of the death penalty statute in its current
104. See Metro Briefing, Queens: Man Resentenced in Wendy’s Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at B4.
105. See John Caher, Senate Republicans Blast Court as Activist, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2,
2005, at col. 4. (“‘I personally believe the Court of Appeals looked desperately to find
something’ on which to reverse the death sentence, said Senator Dale M. Volker, a
Republican from the Buffalo area and longtime champion of capital punishment.”).
106. Id.
107. Senator Dale Volker, New York State Court of Appeals Blows It Again,
Oct. 23, 2007, http://senatorvolker.com/59/news/07-10-23/new_york_state_court_of_
appeals_blows_it_again.aspx.
108. Joel Stashenko, Citing Flawed Law, Split Panel Vacates Final Death Sentence,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 2007, at col. 4.
109. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984-85 (N.Y. 2007) (noting that passing an
amended statute “is easy to do if the Legislature wants to do it”).
110. Caher, supra note 105 R
111. Id.
112. Senate Bill 7720, passed in Senate on August 11, 2004, expired without an
assembly vote. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 400.27 (McKinney 2007) (Practice
Commentaries).
113. On February 25, 2005, Senate Bill 7720 was reintroduced as Senate Bill 2727
and passed in the Senate on March 9, 2005 in a vote of 37-22. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET
AL., supra note 19, at 56 n.67; see also Russell G. Murphy, People v. Cahill:  Domestic
Violence and the Death Penalty Debate in New York, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1029, 1049 n.79
(2005) [hereinafter Murphy, Cahill].  Senate Bill 2727’s anticipatory deadlock instruc-
tion gives jurors three sentencing options for individuals guilty of first degree murder:
death, life without parole, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after a minimum
of 20 years, with a deadlock sentence of life without parole. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET
AL., supra note 19, at 56.
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form,114 introduced legislation to amend the statute’s sentencing
provisions.  Although various amendments to section 400.27(10)
have passed in the Senate, none have gained approval in the As-
sembly.115  This failure to reinstate the death penalty indicates a
change in political support among New Yorkers since 1995.116  The
judicially-imposed moratorium on capital punishment in New York
allowed the state legislature and general populace to consider
whether capital punishment remains a viable and desirable punish-
ment.117  Recent developments suggest that the majority of New
Yorkers are loath to reinstate capital punishment.
From December 15, 2004 to February 11, 2005, the New York
Assembly Standing Committees on Codes, Judiciary and Correc-
tion held five public hearings in New York City and Albany.118
The hearings discussed whether the state legislature should amend
the death penalty statute to restore capital punishment in New
York.119  Eighty-seven percent of the witnesses who testified at the
114. Even Senator Dale Volker, who helped draft the 1995 law and supports efforts
to restore the death penalty in New York, admitted defeat when he described the
Taylor decision as the “last nail in the coffin” for the death penalty statute. See
Stashenko, supra note 108. R
115. See, e.g., notes 112-13 & 122 and accompanying text.
116. In New York’s 1994 gubernatorial campaign, Republican candidate George
Pataki, running against death penalty opponent Mario Cuomo, promised that if
elected, his first priority would be the passage of a death penalty bill. See Ian Fisher,
The 1994 Campaign: Issues; Clamor over Death Penalty Dominates Debate on Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at A.45.  However, by February 15, 2006, a public opinion
poll by the New York Times indicated that public support for Governor Pataki had
“dropped to its lowest level since his first year as governor a decade ago.”  Michael
Slackman & Marjorie Connelly, Pataki’s Ratings Decline Sharply in Poll of State, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A1.  This poll also suggested that “attitudes [had] shift[ed]
against death penalty.” Id.  According to the poll,
56 percent of registered voters surveyed said they preferred either life in
prison without parole or life in prison with the possibility of parole over the
death penalty for people convicted of murder.  Only 34 percent said they
supported the death penalty, a significant drop from the 47 percent who sup-
ported it in 1994, when Mr. Pataki made instituting the death penalty a criti-
cal component of his successful drive to unseat Gov. Mario M. Cuomo.
Id.
117. Press Release, N.Y. State Assembly, Assembly Releases Death Penalty Re-
port, (Apr. 4, 2005), available at http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20050404.
118. See generally JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19. R
119. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver explained that after the LaValle court struck
down the death penalty, “we in the Legislature faced an important choice: act quickly
or act deliberately.  We chose the latter option and conducted a series of extraordi-
nary public hearings to solicit the widest possible range of views on the death penalty
in New York before deciding what action, if any, to take with respect to the statute.”
Press Release, N.Y. State Assembly, supra note 117; see also Murphy, Cahill, supra R
note 113, at 1049. R
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hearings opposed restoring the death penalty in New York, some
favoring outright abolition.120  Accordingly, following the hearings,
the assembly rejected senate-sponsored legislation121 to amend
CPL section 400.27.122  Nothing has changed in New York in the
past few years to indicate that the legislature is any more likely
now to reinstate the death penalty than it was in 2004.123
II. OPTIONS FOR THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE
The Taylor decision means that the state of affairs established by
the LaValle ruling continues in New York: because a deadlock in-
struction is statutorily mandated124 and the current deadlock in-
struction is constitutionally prohibited,125 capital punishment may
not be implemented in its current form.126  Rather than allow a
statute to remain on the books, unconstitutional and inoperable,
the New York State Legislature could decide to take one of two
actions: amend the statute to address the constitutional infirmities
that the Court of Appeals identified in LaValle and Taylor, or af-
firmatively abolish the death penalty.  This section discusses con-
siderations relevant to each option.
120. See Murphy, Cahill, supra note 113, at 1049; see generally JOSEPH LENTOL ET R
AL., supra note 19. R
121. See supra note 113 (discussing S.B. 2727, 2007 Leg. 230 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. R
2007)).
122. The assembly rejected Senate Bill 2727 in an eleven to seven vote. See DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR, NEW YORK TAKES HISTORIC STEP TOWARDS ENDING THE
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2214 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2007); Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty is Blocked by Democrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2005, at B1.  Again, on June 14, 2006 the Codes Committee voted thirteen to
five against reinstating the death penalty. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, New York
Assembly Committee Blocks Death Penalty by Wider Margin, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/article.php?did=2214 (last visited Nov. 29, 2007); see also Murphy, Cahill,
supra note 113, at 1050 n.80. R
123. As Judge Smith observed in People v. Taylor, “nothing else of significance has
changed. No one suggests that any development in the last three years, either in the
law or the law’s effect on the community, has changed the context in which LaValle
was decided.”  People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007).
124. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney 2004).
125. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 359 (N.Y. 2004) (“We hold today that
the deadlock instruction required by CPL 400.27(10) is unconstitutional under the
State constitution because of the unacceptable risk that it may result in a coercive,
and thus arbitrary and unreliable, sentence.”).  The Taylor court held that New York’s
Due Process Clause requires that “jurors be informed of the consequences of their
actions.” Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 977 (citing LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 367).
126. See Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 977-78.
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A. Statutory Amendment
Although the New York State Assembly has thus far not been
receptive towards statutory amendment,127 should its stance
change, it is important to identify the reconstructed sentencing pro-
vision most likely to pass scrutiny with the Court of Appeals.  Be-
cause there is not just one form that an amendment could take, the
following sections review the elements required for a valid jury in-
struction in a capital case and then discuss potential reformulations
of CPL section 400.27 that could satisfy these requirements.128
1. Elements of a Valid Jury Deadlock Instruction
Any amendment to New York’s capital punishment statute must
incorporate several features in order to pass judicial scrutiny, both
at the state and federal level.
First, in New York, an anticipatory deadlock instruction must be
part of any constitutional death penalty scheme.129  The Court of
Appeals in Taylor neatly summarized the characteristics necessary
for an amended deadlock provision: “a non-coercive sentencing
statute that properly informs the jury of the consequences of their
actions.”130  Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as applied to an an-
ticipatory deadlock provision, requires that jurors receive accurate
and unambiguous information.131  Otherwise, jurors might specu-
late about the consequences of deadlock, which diminishes the reli-
ability of the jury’s verdict.132
127. See supra Part I.F.
128. The idea for this section is based on a paper by Jonathan D. Zimet presented
to the New York State Assembly Codes Committee as part of the 2004-2005 public
hearings discussed above in Part I.D. See generally Jonathan D. Zimet, Finding a
Valid Deadlock Instruction in New York after LaValle, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 2 (2005). In
discussing and evaluating various approaches that the Legislature might take in
amending the statute, this section assumes that under any construction of the dead-
lock instruction, the trial court will deliver those instructions in a neutral and accurate
manner.
129. When the LaValle court pronounced Section 400.27(10) of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law unconstitutional, it also stated “the absence of any instruc-
tion is no better than the current instruction.” LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365.  “Like the
flawed deadlock instruction, the absence of an instruction would lead to death
sentences that are based on speculation, as the Legislature apparently feared when it
decided to prescribe the instruction.” Id.
130. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
131. See J. Mark Lane, Is There Life Without Parole?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 327,
358 (1993).  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “accurate sentencing information
is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant
shall live or die by a jury of people who may never have made a sentencing decision.”
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976).
132. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 365-67.
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Moreover, the deadlock instruction must not, in form or sub-
stance, coerce a jury decision in any particular way.133  Most jurors
lack the experience and legal knowledge necessary for understand-
ing the substance and procedure of sentencing without guidance.
Jurors naturally look to the judge for such guidance.  The sentenc-
ing instruction must therefore offer a balanced and neutral per-
spective134 to avoid influencing the jury decision.135
A revised deadlock instruction must also avoid the coercive in-
fluence seen in the current version of CPL section 400.27 where the
deadlock sentence is one which the sentencing jury cannot choose
and “might [not] even . . . consider[ ] palatable.”136  As discussed
above,137 this provision could engender fear amongst jurors that
deadlock will result in a parole-eligible sentence.138  A revised
deadlock instruction can thus avoid coercion by including the dead-
lock sentence as one of the jury’s sentencing options.139
2. Four Possible Reformulations of New York’s
Deadlock Provision
This section proposes four ways of amending New York’s dead-
lock instruction.  The advantages and drawbacks of each proposal
are analyzed in light of the judicial requirements and legislative
considerations discussed above.140
a. Option 1
One possible reformulation (“Option 1”) of New York’s dead-
lock provision gives the jury two sentencing options, death or life
without parole, and informs the jury that upon deadlock the trial
court will sentence the defendant to life without parole.141  The
133. See id. at 362 (“A coerced verdict ‘ought not to be allowed to stand in any
case, and least of all, in one involving a human life.’”  (quoting People v. Sheldon, 50
N.E. 840, 846 (1898))).
134. The faulty charge given by the trial judge in Taylor illustrates the importance
of accuracy and neutrality in capital sentencing instructions. See supra Part I.E.2.
135. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 362 (citing the “heightened need for reliability in
death penalty cases,” and emphasizing that “the goal of jury unanimity may not un-
dermine sentencing reliability, particularly where the sentence is death”).
136. Id. at 364 n.19.
137. See supra Part I.E.1.
138. See LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 357-58, 360.
139. Whether the deadlock sentence should or should not provide for parole-eligi-
bility is debatable, as discussed in Part II.A.1.
140. See supra Part II.A.1.
141. This reconstruction of CPL 400.27(10) has been proposed by the New York
State Senate in Bills to reinstate the death penalty for convicted murderers of police
officers, corrections officers, and employees of the Department of Correctional Ser-
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ504.txt unknown Seq: 20  4-NOV-08 13:25
1158 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
Court of Appeals approved this option in both LaValle and Taylor
as an acceptable method of legislative amendment.142  By allowing
the jury to impose the deadlock sentence during sentencing and
providing that deadlock will not lead to the defendant’s release,
this option removes the potential for coercion.143  If the jury is di-
vided in deliberations, no juror will feel pressured to alter his vote
simply to avoid deadlock.  For a juror who favors life without pa-
role, the deadlock sentence is the sentence he prefers.  Similarly, a
juror who favors death will not change his vote simply to reach
unanimity.  Whether he surrenders his vote and sides with jurors
favoring life without parole or waits for deadlock the sentence will
be the same.  Rather than alter his position, this option encourages
a death-prone member of a potentially deadlocked jury to engage
his colleagues in dialogue in an attempt to persuade them of his
views.144  This open debate among jurors in sentencing delibera-
tions is the very goal of jury-sentencing:145 that the ultimate out-
come of jury deliberations should reflect the views of the
community.146
One shortcoming of Option 1 is that the deadlock sentence fails
to accord the defendant as much leniency as jurors or the legisla-
ture might desire.  New York’s current deadlock provision reveals
a legislative intent that if the jury fails to agree on either of the
harsher sentences of death or life without parole, the defendant
should receive a third, more lenient sentence.  On the other hand,
the legislature only intended for jurors to have two sentencing op-
vices. See, e.g., S.B. 6414, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 7799,
2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S.B. 319, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y.
2007).
142. See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 979 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that legislative
correction, “may be as simple as enacting a sentencing statute that provides for life
without parole if the jury cannot unanimously agree on death”); see also id. at 984
(“LaValle reads the Constitution to require an anticipatory deadlock instruction tell-
ing the jurors, in substance, that the consequence of a hung jury will be life without
parole.”); People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561, 603 (N.Y. 2003) (“The only constitution-
ally proper sentence for a judge to impose upon the failure of the jury to decide
between death and life imprisonment without parole is the lesser sentence considered
by the jury-life imprisonment without parole. Such a result ensures that the jury’s
verdict expresses the true conscience of the community and is not the result of uncer-
tainty or coercion.”) (Smith, J., concurring).
143. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 364 n.19.
144. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 150, LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341
(N.Y. 2004) (No. 71), 2004 WL 1352004, at *150.
145. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999).
146. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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tions, neither of which included parole-eligibility.147  Through deci-
sions such as LaValle and Taylor, the Court of Appeals has
indicated that where the jury is only allowed two options, the dead-
lock sentence should be the same as the alternative to death.
b. Option 2
A second way that the legislature could amend the anticipatory
deadlock provision (“Option 2”) is to give the jury three sentenc-
ing options, death, life without parole, and life with parole-eligibil-
ity, and inform the jury that upon deadlock the trial court will
impose a parole-eligible life sentence.
Option 2 improves upon CPL section 400.27(10) in two ways.
First, the deadlock sentence is one which the jurors themselves can
choose.  Second, this formulation retains a parole-eligible deadlock
sentence, which conforms with the intent reflected in CPL section
400.27(10) that if the jury fails to agree unanimously on a sentence,
the defendant should receive the most lenient sentence.
Nevertheless, Option 2 remains coercive.  If the jury vote is split
between death and life without parole, Option 2 might cause jurors
in favor of the lesser sentence to change their vote to the harsher
sentence to avoid a parole-eligible deadlock sentence.
c. Option 3
A third way to reconstruct New York’s capital sentencing in-
struction (“Option 3”) is to allow the jury the three sentencing al-
ternatives of death, life without parole, and life with parole
eligibility, with the provision that upon deadlock the court will sen-
tence the defendant to life without parole.148
Option 3 avoids the problems seen in the current statute in two
ways.  It allows the jury to choose a parole-eligible sentence, and
also does not coerce a verdict.  Jurors can decide whether the de-
147. See Cahill, 809 N.E.2d at 600 n.8.  “[T]he legislative history clearly shows that
the legislators intended that the jury consider only the options of death and life with-
out parole, while disregarding the sentence of life with parole, which was solely within
the realm of the trial judge’s power.” Id.
148. Option 3 reflects the reconstruction of Criminal Procedure Law Section
400.27(10) proposed by the New York State Legislature in various bills to amend the
statute. See, e.g., Assem. B. 8157, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S.B. 4632,
2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 6605, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis.
Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 6007, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem.
B. 2207, 2007 Leg., 229th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 2209, 2007 Leg., 229th
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); Assem. B. 2210, 2007 Leg., 229th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007);
Assem. B. 2212, 2007 Leg., 229th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
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fendant merits parole, but need not fear that deadlock will trigger
parole-eligibility.
A problem with Option 3, however, arises when the jury is split:
eleven jurors favoring a parole-eligible sentence and the remaining
juror in favor of either life without parole or death.  In this situa-
tion, one holdout juror can effectively impose a sentence that the
majority of jurors found too harsh.  If the government fails to con-
vince all twelve jurors that the defendant merits life without parole,
the legislature might see no reason for imposing this sentence upon
deadlock.  CPL section 400.27(10) mandates a lower deadlock sen-
tence than even the jury could impose, indicating a legislative in-
tent to construe deadlock in the defendant’s favor.  Although the
U.S. Supreme Court does “not require the legislature to select the
least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not
cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved,”149 if
the New York State Legislature’s original intent of leniency re-
mains, the deadlock sentence in any reconstructed sentencing pro-
vision should not be greater than the minimum sentence the jury
considers.
Furthermore, the eleven-to-one dynamic discussed above may
pose due process problems.  If the deadlock sentence is the greater
of the two sentences between which jurors are split, the ultimate
sentence will not reflect an individualized determination of the ap-
propriate punishment.  The Supreme Court says that as long as a
jury finds facts150 warranting a certain range of sentences, the judge
can impose a sentence within that approved range.151  Under Op-
tion 3, however, the deadlock sentence is not based on the judge’s
personal determination, but on an automatic statutory provision.
Therefore, in certain circumstances Option 3 mandates a sentence
of life without parole even though the majority of jurors found suf-
ficient mitigating evidence to warrant a parole-eligible sentence.
The Supreme Court might not find fault with Option 3, since the
automatic sentence here is life without parole, not death.152  Life
149. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976).
150. For example, aggravating circumstances.
151. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,
515 (1995) (allows advisory jury recommendation with sentence determined by court);
Spaziano v. Florida 468 U.S. 447, 466 (1984) (jury need not impose sentence; allows
jury override).
152. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (finding mandatory
death penalty statute unconstitutional because sentencer was not allowed to consider
the defendant’s character and record); see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
(“[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to circum-
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without parole, however, is a permanent deprivation of liberty, and
the New York Court of Appeals avowedly construes the protec-
tions of the state’s due process clause more broadly than those of
its federal counterpart.153  The Court of Appeals might therefore
decide that the Option 3 deadlock scheme violates the state’s due
process requirement of an individualized sentencing determination.
d. Option 4
New York’s anticipatory deadlock provision could be reformu-
lated in a fourth way (“Option 4”) in an effort to more closely re-
present the will of the jury and with it, the will of society.154 Option
4 could amend CPL section 400.27(10) to create three sentencing
choices, death, life without parole, and parole eligibility, and in-
struct the jury that upon deadlock the trial court will either impose
a sentence of life without parole or life with parole eligibility.155
This deadlock sentence would depend on the results the jury re-
ports to the court in a special verdict form.156
Whether the deadlock sentence is life without parole or life with
parole eligibility would depend on which sentence receives more
votes.  Because New York’s capital punishment scheme prohibits a
death sentence unsupported by a unanimous jury vote, any vote for
death would be treated under Option 4’s deadlock provision as a
vote for life without parole.  Under this scheme, the deadlock sen-
tence is life without parole any time that the combined votes for
death and life without parole outweigh those for parole eligibility.
In the rare case that votes are evenly split between death and pa-
role eligibility or the total votes for death and life without parole
equal the number of votes for parole eligibility, the judge will im-
pose a parole-eligible deadlock sentence.  The rationale of Option
4 is to construe deadlock in favor of the defendant.  CPL section
stances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the
choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
153. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 365 (N.Y. 2004).
154. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. R
155. See generally Zimet, supra note 128. R
156. The jury will submit to the court a special verdict form detailing each juror’s
final vote and the factors she considered in reaching this determination.  Special ver-
dict forms are used in capital trials in Alabama, Georgia, Oregon, and Utah. Id.  “In
Utah, if the jury deadlocks between life without parole and parole-eligible life, the
court is required to sentence the defendant to parole-eligible life, unless ten or more
jurors voted for life without parole.” Id. at n.122 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207(5)(c) (West 2008)).
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400.27(10) shows that the New York State Legislature intended the
deadlock sentence to benefit the defendant.  It is only fair that
where jurors cannot reach unanimous agreement, the defendant
should receive the least severe of all sentencing options.
The advantage of the method provided by Option 4 is that jurors
have a non-coerced, individual vote and are encouraged to vote
according to their own judgment because they know that their vote
will count in the end.  No juror will surrender her personal assess-
ment of the appropriate sentence because the only way to ensure
that the sentence she favors is applied, whether in sentencing or
upon deadlock, is to vote for it.  The ultimate sentence imposed
will be no greater than that considered by the jury, and this sen-
tencing structure ensures that the sentence properly reflects the
jury’s intent.
Option 4, however, invites juror speculation.  In the pre-sentenc-
ing instructions, the trial court will not be able to definitively tell
the jury which sentence the defendant will receive if the jury dead-
locks.  This uncertainty among jurors when deliberating might
render the ultimate verdict unreliable.157
Furthermore, the very absence of a “coercive” influence in Op-
tion 4 increases the probability of deadlock.  Under Option 4, ju-
rors entering the sentencing phase of a capital trial know that if
they cannot agree the court will simply impose the sentence for
which the majority of jurors vote.  Allowing jurors to impose a ver-
dict simply by failing to reach unanimity “dilute[s] the voting
power of the minority.”158  Jurors in the majority, aware that una-
nimity is not necessary for their vote to prevail, will feel little need
to engage in full sentencing deliberations.  A deadlock sentence
that effectively allows the majority to dictate the deadlock sentence
“stifles debate and renders some juror’s votes meaningless.”159
The sentencing scheme of Option 4 may discourage a capital jury
from considering and fully discussing all sentencing opinions.  A
jury’s potential failure to “engag[e] in thorough consideration of
157. See id.
158. Tulchin, supra note 47, at 491.  While Tulchin advocates against allowing the R
use of majority verdicts in New York criminal trials, his discussion of non-unanimity is
relevant to the above formulation of a deadlock sentence because by informing the
jury that if they fail to unanimously agree, the court will impose the verdict rendered
by the majority, it effectively permits the jury to circumvent the unanimity require-
ment as laid out in Criminal Procedure Law section 400.27(11).
159. Id. at 491-92 (“[S]tudies have . . . shown that jurors in trial requiring [only] a
majority verdict do not listen to or respect each other’s views as much as in cases
requiring unanimous verdicts.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ504.txt unknown Seq: 25  4-NOV-08 13:25
2008] NEW YORK’S DEFEATED DEATH PENALTY 1163
the evidence and legal issues presented at trial”160 increases the
likelihood that the verdict returned by the jury upon deadlock is
neither accurate nor reliable.161
B. Abolishing the Death Penalty in New York
The LaValle and Taylor decisions increased the already active
and emotional debate in New York regarding the death penalty.162
The emotional appeal of the death penalty was seen in New York’s
1994 gubernatorial election in which George Pataki beat incum-
bent Governor Mario Cuomo in part through his promise that if
elected he would sign a death penalty bill into law.163  The tide of
popular opinion within New York, however, has turned since
1995.164  This was particularly evident at the 2004-2005 public hear-
ings where 148 of the 170 people who testified objected to the
death penalty.165  Indeed, rather than simply allow the death pen-
alty statute to remain nonfunctional, the legislature could follow
New Jersey’s example by affirmatively abolishing the death
penalty.
1. National Trends
New York is not the only state to question the wisdom of capital
punishment.  The intense controversy over capital punishment,
marked by increasing doubts about its application and administra-
tion, is seen nationwide.  Concerns of innocence, arbitrariness, and
racial and socioeconomic biases in capital sentencing have caused
state lawmakers to propose modifications to their capital punish-
ment laws, impose moratoriums, or abolish the death penalty.166
In January 2006, the New Jersey Legislature placed a statewide
moratorium on capital punishment and appointed a commission to
investigate and evaluate the effectiveness of New Jersey’s death
160. Id.
161. See generally AM. L. INST., ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS
(2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf.
162. The de jure moratorium on capital punishment imposed by LaValle led New
Yorkers to question whether the statute is worth resurrecting. See generally JOSEPH
LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19. R
163. Patrick D. Healy, New York Assembly Democrats Close off Death Penalty for
2005, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at B1.
164. See supra text accompanying note 116. R
165. JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 3. R
166. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:  How Medicine
Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 61-62 & n.54, 62 nn.55-56
(2007), available at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/articles/500flspub8851.pdf.
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penalty statute.167  The commission reported that twelve of its thir-
teen members recommended abolishing the death penalty168 and
replacing it with a life sentence without the possibility of parole.169
New Jersey formally abolished the death penalty on December 17,
2007.170
Although no other state has gone so far towards abolition as
New Jersey, several states have recently reconsidered the merits of
capital punishment and imposing the death penalty less often.171
This trend, which death penalty scholar Jeffrey Kirchmeier terms
the “moratorium movement,”172 is reflected in states imposing
moratoriums on capital punishment,173 creating death penalty
study commissions,174 and advancing abolitionist measures.175
167. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION
RECOMMENDS ABOLITION OF STATE’S DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/article.php?did=2208 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
168. By abolishing the death penalty, New Jersey would be the first state to do so in
over thirty years. See Laura Mansnerus, Panel Seeks End to Death Penalty for New
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1.  In 1982, ten years after the U.S. Supreme
Court halted executions nationwide, New Jersey reinstated capital punishment. Id.
No executions took place under New Jersey’s 1982 death penalty statute.  Peter G.
Verniero, Appealed to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 14NJ.
169. See M. WILLIAM HOWARD ET AL., NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY
COMMISSION REPORT 56 (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/
dpsc_final.pdf.  In its Report, the New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission found
that “[t]here is no compelling evidence that the New Jersey death penalty rationally
serves a legitimate penological intent.” Id. at 24.  In fact, the Commission decided
that “[t]he alternative of life imprisonment in a maximum security institution without
the possibility of parole would sufficiently ensure public safety and address other le-
gitimate social and penological interests, including the interests of the families of mur-
der victims.” Id. at 56.
170. Jeremy W. Peters, Corzine Signs Bill Ending Executions, Then Commutes
Sentences of Eight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at B3.
171. See Robert Tanner, Death Sentences In 2006 Fall To Lowest Level In 30 Years,
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Lawrence, Kan.), Jan. 5, 2007, available at http://www2.ljworld.
com/news/2007/jan/05/death_sentences_2006_fall_lowest_level_30_years/ (“The num-
ber of death sentences handed out in the United States dropped in 2006 to the lowest
level since capital punishment was reinstated 30 years ago.”).
172. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here:  The Death
Penalty Moratorium Movement In The United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2002).
This movement is not necessarily abolition-oriented; “many in the modern movement
only desire a moratorium on executions in order to attempt to fix the problems.” Id.
at 21.
173. As seen in New Jersey and Illinois.
174. Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico and North Carolina state Legisla-
tures have created death penalty study commissions or advanced abolition measures.
A Divergent Path:  A Death Penalty Shutdown, but Not in Texas, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 15, 2007, at 2P.  Tennessee plans to create a commission to study the
state’s death penalty statute.  See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Tennessee Legislature
Overwhelmingly Approves Death Penalty Study (2007) (on file with author). Penn-
sylvania has convened a commission of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law
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For example, in 2000, then-Governor George Ryan ordered a
moratorium on all state executions, noting that while Illinois had
executed only twelve death row prisoners since the 1977 reinstate-
ment of the death penalty in Illinois, thirteen had been exoner-
ated.176  Governor Ryan appointed a commission to study Illinois’
death penalty system and recommend reform.177 Before he left
office in 2003, Ryan pardoned four prisoners facing execution and
commuted the death sentences of the remaining 167 inmates on
death row.178  The Illinois commission concluded that abolishing
the death penalty is the only way to prevent executing innocent
people.179  Illinois is currently in its eighth year of moratorium on
state executions.
enforcement officers and victims’ advocates to study the causes of wrongful convic-
tions and make recommendations for preventing them in the state. DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION TO STUDY WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2007),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2218 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (on
file with author).
175. Over the past year, at least twelve other states considered legislation to repeal
the death penalty.  In February 2007, the Montana Senate gave preliminary approval
to a bill abolishing the death penalty.  See Gregg Sangillo, Death and Innocence,
NAT’L J., Apr. 28, 2007, at 36, 38.  In March 2007, legislation to repeal the death
penalty in Nebraska failed in the state’s judiciary committee by one vote.  Similarly
legislation to abolish Maryland’s death penalty lost in a tied Senate Committee vote.
See id.; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Law Enforcement Officials Gather in Maryland
to Oppose Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2209 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2008) (on file with author).  Furthermore, in 2008, bills to abolish the
death penalty or impose a moratorium on executions were introduced in Alabama,
Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, and Virginia.  See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
DEATH PENALTY IN FLUX, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2289
(last visited Aug. 26, 2008) (on file with author).
176. Greta Proctor, Reevaluating Capital Punishment:  The Fallacy of a Foolproof
System, the Focus on Reform, and the International Factor, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 211, 223
(2007) [hereinafter Proctor, Reevaluating].
177. Although the death penalty commission provided the Illinois Legislature with
eighty-five suggestions for reforming the death penalty statute, none of these recom-
mended changes were enacted. Id.
178. Id.
179. Testimony Regarding the Future of Capital Punishment in New York State
Before the New York State Assembly Comms. on Codes, Judiciary, and Corrections,
2005 Leg., N.Y. (2005) (testimony of Robert Perry, Legislative Director, New York
Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.nyclu.org/node/831 [hereinafter
Testimony].
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2. Arguments For and Against Abolishing New York’s
Death Penalty
Some accept or reject capital punishment for moral reasons.  Re-
tributivists cite religious and philosophical arguments180 to show
that the worst criminals deserve the most severe penalty, death.181
But retaliation and revenge are inimical to the public in a free and
democratic society.182  The Supreme Court rejects “retribution as a
permissible goal of punishment.”183  Rather, the Court promotes
deterrence, general and individualized, and incapacitation as just
capital punishment objectives.184  Examination of the efficacy, effi-
ciency, and expedience of capital punishment is therefore impor-
tant in deciding New York policy on the death penalty.185
Considerations informing this debate include:  capital punishment’s
effectiveness as a deterrent to murder,186 interests in the perma-
nent incapacitation of the most violent criminals,187 the expenses
stemming from capital prosecution,188 the disparate application of
the death penalty within New York State,189 the humanity of differ-
ent methods of execution,190 and the possibility of executing an in-
nocent person.191
180. For discussion of religious and philosophical stances on capital punishment, see
generally Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 815 (Jules Coleman & Scott Sha-
piro eds., 2002); E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN
CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION (2003); RELIGION AND THE DEATH PENALTY:  A
CALL FOR RECKONING (E. Owens et al. eds., 2004).
181. See generally Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 335 (2004). But see Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud:  A Retribu-
tivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Pen-
alty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005) (providing retributivist arguments
against the death penalty); Perry, supra note 7, at 887-88. R
182. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972).
183. Id. at 344.
184. See id. at 343 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958)).
185. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?] (“For
the first time in a generation, the question of whether the death penalty deters
murders has captured the attention of scholars in law and economics, setting off an
intense new debate about one of the central justifications for capital punishment.”).
186. See infra Part II.B.3.
187. See infra Part II.B.4.
188. See infra Part II.B.5.
189. See infra Part III.E.1.
190. See infra Part III.E.4.
191. See infra Part III.E.3.
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3. Does Death Deter?
For more than three decades, academics have struggled to deter-
mine whether capital punishment actually deters future murders.192
An especially relevant question in New York193 is whether capital
punishment is more successful than life without parole as a deter-
rent to violent crime.194  The question of deterrence is really one of
“marginal deterrence:” whether, all else being equal, the presence
and use of capital punishment deters more homicides than the
“next most severe” punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.195  The answer to this question is relevant for
states deciding capital punishment policy.196  Evidence that capital
executions deter violent crimes and therefore save innocent lives
can counter moral concerns that state-imposed killing is unethical
and unjustified.197
Even if New York does not resurrect a full-fledged death penalty
statute, some people argue that we should preserve death to punish
the worst offenders like terrorists and cop killers.198  In 2005, the
senate introduced legislation to enact capital punishment for
criminals who kill police officers.199  Supporting the bill, then-Gov-
ernor Pataki hoped to ensure that such criminals “face the maxi-
mum penalties.”200  The idea is not just one of retribution and
permanent incapacitation, but of “deter[ring] criminals from killing
192. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
193. In New York, first degree murder prosecutions under the death penalty stat-
ute, section 400.27 of the Criminal Procedure Law, currently have a maximum penalty
of life without parole.  People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 368 (N.Y. 2004).
194. Furman, 408 U.S. at 345-48.
195. Perry, supra note 7, at 891 n.68 (quoting Robert Weisberg, The Death Penalty R
Meets Social Science:  Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 151, 152 (2005)).
196. See Hashem Dezhbaksh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Ef-
fect? New Evidence from Post-moratorium Panel Data, AM. L. & ECON. REV., Aug.
2003, at 344, available at http://www.cjlf.org/deathpenalty/DezRubShepDeterFinal.pdf
[hereinafter Dezhbaksh, Deterrent Effect].
197. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, On The Economics of Capital Punishment, ECONO-
MISTS’ VOICE, Feb. 2006, at 2, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss3/art4 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermuele, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? Acts, Omissions and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 750 (2005)
[hereinafter Sunstein & Vermuele, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?]; Liptak,
Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
198. Press Release, Joseph L. Bruno, N.Y. State Senate, Senate Calls on Governor,
Assembly to Enact Death Penalty Bill (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://senate.state.
ny.us/pressreleases.nsf/a9c64cb05dda7e7e85256aff006d42c0/c76cc222ad5f5c2e852572
c80063v653f?OpenDocument.
199. S.B. 319, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
200. Winnie Hu, Pataki Calls Special Session on Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2005, at B1.
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the officers who serve to protect us.”201  A 2007 case in Brooklyn,
charging three defendants with murdering two police officers,
spurred renewed efforts to reinstate the death penalty.202  In July
2007, the New York State Senate passed legislation203 establishing
the death penalty for first-degree murder where the victim is a po-
lice officer, peace officer, or correction officer.204  The bill provides
the jury with sentencing options of death or life imprisonment
without parole and a deadlock sentence of life without parole.205
Senator Joseph Bruno promoted this legislation as a way to “pro-
tect our communities, and our police officers, from violent
criminals.”206  But prisoners in New York would actually have to be
executed in order for the purported deterrent effect to materialize.
A statute that has never been strongly enforced cannot claim to
factor into a criminal’s decision of whether or not to commit a
crime.  If the argument in favor of executing cop killers centers on
incapacitation, some argue that life imprisonment is sufficient.207
Bruno disagrees, citing the murder of ten law enforcement officials
within thirty months as proof that “life imprisonment doesn’t
work.”208
Proving a strong negative correlation between execution and
homicide is not easy.  For each of the recent studies claiming that
executions save lives,209 there is a study to refute these results.210
201. See Press Release, Bruno, supra note 198. R
202. Dexter Bostic, Robert Ellis, and Lee Woods were charged in Brooklyn Crimi-
nal Court for killing two police officers. See Anthony M. DeStefano, Pair Will Face
Court Crowded with Cops, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2007, at A02 [hereinafter DeStefano,
Pair Will Face Court].
203. See S.B. 6414, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
204. S.B. 6414 is the same as Assem. B. 7799, 2007 Leg., 230th Legis. Sess. (N.Y.
2007), and S.B. 319 (prefiled Dec. 27, 2007, and introduced Jan. 3, 2007). Senate
Passes Death Penalty Legislation, U.S. STATE NEWS, July 16, 2007; see also John An-
nese, Pressure Grows to Make Cop Killing a Federal Death-Penalty Case:  But Murder
of Island Officer Remains in Hands of Brooklyn D.A. Hynes, STATEN ISLAND AD-
VANCE, July 18, 2007, at A06; DeStefano, Pair Will Face Court, supra note 202; R
205. Senate Passes Death Penalty Legislation, supra note 204; see also DeStefano, R
Pair Will Face Court, supra note 202. R
206. Senate Passes Death Penalty Legislation, supra note 204. R
207. Assemblyman Joseph Lentol believes life without parole is an adequate pun-
ishment because it deters violent crime and guards against the risk of executing an
innocent person. See James M. Odato, Death Penalty Bill Urged:  Senate Renews Call
for Law After Cop Shootings, Asks Spitzer to Get Assembly on Board, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Apr. 26, 2007, http://timesunion.com/AspStories/storyprint.asp?Story
ID=584145 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
208. Id.
209. See Becker, supra note 197, at 2; Dezhbaksh, Deterrent Effect, supra note 196; R
H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting off Death Row:  Commuted Sentences and
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. & ECON. 453 (2003) [hereinafter
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The debate about whether capital punishment actually deters
homicide is still unresolved.  Even Gary Becker, winner of the 1992
Nobel Prize in economics, who believes capital punishment “is
worth using for the worst sort of offenses,”211 admits that “current
empirical evidence [is] ‘certainly not decisive.’”212
Logic dictates that the greater the punishment the greater its de-
terrent effect.  Accordingly, one might assume that as the most se-
vere of all punishments, death has the greatest success in
preventing violent crime.  Based on the theory that “as the cost of
an activity rises, the amount of that activity will drop,”213 econo-
mists study changes in murder rates within and across states and
counties, hoping to determine whether use of the death penalty af-
fects homicide rates.  For each inmate executed, such studies claim,
five214 to eighteen215 homicides are prevented.
Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row]; Sunstein & Vermuele, Is Capital Punish-
ment Morally Required?, supra note 197. R
210. See also Deterrence and the Death Penalty:  A Critical Review of New Evidence,
Hearings on the Future of Capital Punishment in the State of New York Before the N.Y.
State Assem. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assem. Standing Comm. on Judiciary & As-
sem. Standing Comm. on Corr., 2005 Leg. (N.Y. 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan,
Professor, Columbia Law School), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
FaganTestimony.pdf [hereinafter Hearings]; Richard Berk, New Claims about Execu-
tions and General Deterrence: Deja Vu All over Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
303 (2005), available at http://preprints.stat.ucla.edu/396/jels.pap.pdf; John J. Donohue
& Justin Wolfers, The Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment:  Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005) [herein-
after Donohue & Wolfers, Ethics and Empirics]; Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence
Redux:  Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 255 (2006); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Capital Punishment and Capital Murder:
Market Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803
(2006);  Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence,
5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003);  John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, The Death
Penalty:  No Evidence for Deterrence, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Apr. 2006, http://
www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss5/art3/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Donohue
& Wolfers, No Evidence for Deterrence].
211. Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row, supra note 209, at 469 (finding a
“significant” correlation between rates of execution, removal, and commutation, and
homicide rates.  For every execution that occurred, five fewer homicides occurred; for
every additional commutation of a death sentence, five more murders occurred; and
for each additional removal from death row, one additional murder was committed).
215. See Dezhbaksh, Deterrent Effect, supra note 196, at 344 (finding that “each R
execution results, on average, in eighteen fewer murders, with a margin of error of
plus or minus ten . . . [and] results are not driven by tougher sentencing laws”).  The
results of this study were challenged as “not credible” by Professors Donohue and
Wolfers. See Donohue & Wolfers, No Evidence for Deterrence, supra note 210, at 2. R
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Deterrence studies, however, often suffer from failure to isolate
effects of execution policy on homicide from other possible reasons
for changes in the rate of violent crime.216  Changes in
demographics, economic conditions, conviction rates, longer jail
sentences, increased imposition of life without parole,217 and har-
sher prison conditions218 may just as easily deter murder as use of
the death penalty.219
Furthermore, statistical findings can be “skewed by data from a
few anomalous jurisdictions” like Texas,220 for example, where ex-
ecutions are frequent and occur relatively soon after sentencing.221
Sociologist Richard Berk conducted a nationwide deterrence study
working under the premise that data from “outlier” states like
Texas, with unusually high execution rates, might influence and
overshadow statistical results.  Using data from fifty states over a
twenty-one year period,222 Berk compared the average number of
executions to the average number of homicides.223  By removing
outliers like Texas, Berk found that where five or fewer executions
occurred, there was no relationship between the execution and
homicide rates.224
Another problem in proving deterrence is distinguishing be-
tween capital punishment’s effect on premeditated crimes and
those that are unplanned and irrational.  Deterrence studies are
often based on the premise that “a rational offender . . . respond[s]
to perceived costs and benefits of committing crime.”225  It is true
216. As Professor Donohue observed in a 2005 critique of modern deterrence stud-
ies, “existing estimates contain no (or inadequate) controls for [other] factors [that]
might be driving the correlation between homicides and executions.”  Donohue &
Wolfers, Ethics and Empirics, supra note 210, at 821. R
217. See Fagan, Capital Punishment, supra note 210, at 1831 (finding no marginal R
deterrent effect of the threat of execution compared to the threat of life imprison-
ment).  “Offenders faced with the threat of execution are not substituting less risky
varieties of crime for crimes that lead to murder and capital risk, nor are they aban-
doning the types of crimes that might lead to a capital offense.” Id.
218. See Katz, Prison Conditions, supra note 210, at 321-22, 331 (finding that poor R
prison conditions deterred crime, but that there was no statistically significant rela-
tionship between executions and violent crimes).
219. See Donohue & Wolfers, Ethics and Empirics, supra note 210, at 821; see also R
Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
220. See Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
221. Id.
222. The period was from 1977 to 1997.
223. Berk, New Claims, supra note 210, at 3 n.4 (finding that in most states the R
average number of executions fell below five while Texas had a total of twenty-nine,
and finding that this disparity would heavily skew the results).
224. Id. at 11-14.
225. Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row, supra note 209, at 454. R
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that, as the most severe penalty, capital punishment “represents a
very high cost for committing murder.”226  For “rational offend-
ers,” at least, the presence and use of the death penalty in a state
should inhibit the commission of death-eligible crimes.227  Not eve-
ryone agrees, however, that potential murderers make these kinds
of rational calculations, especially in death penalty states that
rarely or never execute.228  A study by Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E.
Zimring, and Amanda Geller observed no decline in death-eligible
homicides relative to non-eligible cases.229  The authors surmised
that many murderers are “present-oriented” and so do not take
into account the costs of detection.230
On the other hand, studies claim that commuting a death sen-
tence or removing a prisoner from death row231 decreases
criminals’ perceived cost of committing a crime.232  This study
predicts that commutation or removal will result in a correspond-
ing increase in homicides.233  Thus, in New York, where all seven
death sentences imposed under the 1995 statute were over-
turned,234 one would expect the homicide rate to increase since
prospective murderers would likely see the death penalty statute as
ineffective and inconsequential.  Instead, homicide has decreased
state-wide since New York instituted capital punishment in 1995.235
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
229. See Fagan, Capital Punishment, supra note 210, at 1859 (examining homicide R
rates nationwide since Gregg v. Georgia).  The authors expected to find that an in-
creased risk of execution in a death penalty state would lead to a proportionate de-
crease in death-eligible crimes and no effect on non-eligible crimes.  Instead, they
consistently found no “marginal deterrent effect of the threat or example of execution
on those cases at risk.” Id. at 1860.
230. Id. at 1833.
231. Death sentences are commuted or removed, for example, when an appellate
court declares a capital sentence unconstitutional or maintains conviction but over-
turns a death sentence.
232. Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row, supra note 209, at 21. A study of R
homicide rates between 1977 and 1997 by Mocan and Gittings analyzed the relation-
ship between execution, removal, and commutation rates of death row prisoners and
the rate of homicide.  The results showed five additional homicides resulting from
each commutation of a death sentence, and one additional homicide for every re-
moval from death row. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
233. See Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row, supra note 209, at 21.
234. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 148; People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d R
969, 977 (N.Y. 2007); Alfonso A. Castillo, Shulman Taken off Death Row, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 26, 2005, at A26 (discussing overturning of Shulman, LaValle, and McCoy
sentences).
235. See infra note 236 and accompanying text. R
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Joseph L. Bruno, New York Senate Majority leader and death
penalty advocate, attributes the declining homicide rate in New
York over the past decade to the death penalty’s success as a strong
deterrent to violent crimes.236  In support of this cause-and-effect
theory, Bruno cites the decline in murders committed in New York,
from 1,551 in 1995 to 922 in 2003.237  But no executions have actu-
ally occurred under New York’s 1995 statute.238  Perhaps Bruno be-
lieves that the threat of capital punishment alone is a sufficient
deterrent.  If so, statistics for New York City undermines his argu-
ment.  City homicide rates have continued to decline since the 2004
invalidation of the state death penalty statute.  The number of re-
corded homicides in New York City decreased from 2,245 in
1990239 to 428 in 2007,240 and overall crime dropped 6.47% between
2006 and 2007.241
Although violent crime has decreased state-wide since the death
penalty was enacted in 1995, this trend occurred in areas like Man-
hattan, where the District Attorney’s Office never even sought the
death penalty.242  In contrast, Monroe County, where prosecutors
have sought the death penalty more often than prosecutors in any
other New York county, has the highest homicide rate in the
State.243  The uniform decline in crime within the state despite the
disparate application of the death penalty244 indicates the influence
of some other method of crime-prevention, such as the increased
use of life without parole.245
236. See Murphy, Cahill, supra note 113, at 1049 n.79.  According to Senator Bruno, R
since 1995 “[t]he number of violent crimes dropped from 151,731 in 1995 to 89,316 in
2003.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. See id.
238. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUS- R
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2006—STATISTICAL TA-
BLES (2007) (detailing, in table nine, the number of persons executed by jurisdiction,
from 1930-2006 and from 1977-2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
html/cp/2006/tables/cp06st09.htm.
239. Al Baker, City Homicides Still Dropping, to Under 500, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2007, A1.
240. See id. Four hundred twelve were actual murders, sixteen were crime victims
who died from injuries sustained. See id.
241. See id. (“[T]he number of rapes, robberies, burglaries, grand larcenies and car
thefts are all on the decline.”).
242. See Testimony, supra note 179. R
243. The City of Rochester, located in Monroe County, has the highest murder rate
in the state. Id.
244. See discussion infra Part II.B.6
245. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization:  Capital Pun-
ishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005) [hereinafter
Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization].
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In reality, there is simply not enough data to isolate the deter-
rent effect of capital punishment.246  From a statistical perspective,
the low number of executions in the United States in the past two
decades are insufficient “to permit strong conclusions” in either di-
rection.247  In fact, states without the death penalty often have
lower homicide rates than those states that use capital punish-
ment.248  This empirical controversy remains unsettled; no study is
conclusive249 and it seems likely that there will always be “residual
uncertainty in social science and legal policy.”250  Moreover, the
deterrence argument is theoretical251 in New York where only
seven people were sentenced to death under the 1995 statute and
no one has been executed.252
4. Incapacitation and the Availability of Life Imprisonment
Without Parole
Incapacitation is another goal of capital punishment.  Death pen-
alty proponents argue that death is the only way to ensure that our
society is forever protected from the most violent criminals.  Even
prisoners sentenced to life without parole could, at some future
point, obtain release either through a change in law or pardon from
the governor.253  Also, without the death penalty, some argue,
there is no way to stop a prisoner from killing while in jail.  If the
maximum possible sentence is life without parole, a prisoner serv-
ing a life sentence has nothing to lose by killing a fellow prisoner or
246. Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives?, supra note 185. R
247. Donohue & Wolfers, No Evidence for Deterrence, supra note 210. R
248. See Testimony, supra note 179 (noting that homicide rates in states with the R
death penalty are between 48% and 100% higher than in states that do not use the
death penalty); see also Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 245, at R
205-06 (documenting a “brutalization effect” of executions, observing an increase in
homicides shortly after an execution, and finding no deterrent effect on murder rates
in eight of the twenty-seven states to execute at least one person between 1977 and
1996, that executions deterred murder in only six of the twenty-seven states, and that
murder levels actually increased in thirteen of the states).
249. As Jeffrey Fagan of Columbia University observed in a 2006 article describing
flaws in recent deterrence studies, “[t]here is no reliable, scientifically sound evidence
that . . . [capital execution] can exert a deterrent effect.”  Fagan, Death and Deter-
rence, supra note 210. R
250. Sunstein & Vermuele, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?, supra note
197, at 750. R
251. See id. at 748 (citing Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assess-
ment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177,
1192-93 (1981)).
252. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 14. R
253. See id.
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prison employee.254  Despite these arguments, many see life with-
out parole as a satisfactory replacement for the death penalty, both
in terms of incapacitation and deterrence.255
5. An Expensive System
Both critics and supporters of the death penalty concede that the
expenses stemming from a capital prosecution, the trial, appeals
process, maintaining a capital defender’s office, housing death row
inmates, and the execution itself, are extensive.  It is difficult to
determine the total cost of capital punishment in New York be-
cause no executions have actually taken place under the 1995 death
penalty statute.256  Nevertheless, between 1995 and 2003, New
York State spent over $160 million on processes related to capital
punishment, despite the fact that not one execution resulted from
this expenditure.257
Evidence shows that life without parole saves money: while capi-
tal prosecutions and appeals cost millions of dollars, life imprison-
ment can cost “less than one million dollars.”258  Until the recent
reversal of his death sentence, John Taylor was the sole occupant of
New York’s death row, located at the Clinton Correctional Facility
254. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 348 (1972).
255. See Hearings, supra note 210 (“[E]xamining declines in homicide rates in . . . R
New York since [the] state’s peak homicide rate in the early 1990’s, one can see the
strong effects of such incapacitative sentences on murder rates. . . . [I]n New York, a
state with no death penalty in April 1995 and no executions, homicide rates declined
over the next decade by 65.5% since the peak in 1990.”); see also Testimony, supra
note 179 (“Social science research indicates that the death penalty does not have an R
additional deterrent value beyond that of a lengthy prison term.”); Donohue &
Wolfers, Ethics and Empirics, supra note 210; Donohue & Wolfers, No Evidence for R
Deterrence, supra note 210; Julian H. Wright, Jr., Life-Without-Parole:  An Alternative R
to Death or Not Much of a Life at All?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1990) [hereinafter
Wright, Life-Without-Parole]; The Right Choice, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan.
29, 2005, at A6 (noting N.Y. State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver’s assertions that
a sentence of life imprisonment, rather than death, “ought to be ample punishment
for the worst criminals imaginable”).
256. See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., COSTS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY AND RELATED ISSUES 5-6 (2005), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/NY-RCD-Test.pdf.
257. See id. (internal citations omitted); see also Testimony, supra note 179 (“After R
the death penalty was reinstated in New York in 1995, the state spent an estimated
$170 million prosecuting a handful of cases.”); Patrick D. Healy, Death Penalty Seems
Unlikely to be Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B1 (noting that as of 2005, the
total expenditure was estimated at $175 million).
258. Wright, Life-Without-Parole, supra note 255, at 558 (“In Florida alone, court R
costs, attorney’s fees, and incarceration of a death row inmate cost approximately 3.2
million dollars, while the state currently can incarcerate a criminal for life for 700,000
dollars.”).
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in Clinton County, which costs about $300,000 per year to main-
tain.259  The additional costs of capital trials in New York, when
compared to non-capital trials, is seen in Queens County, where
“capital trials create 300% to 500% more work than noncapital tri-
als[,]” and in Kings County, where resources had to be reallocated
from prosecutors’ offices of other Boroughs in order to accommo-
date a capital appeal.260  Capital punishment advocates, however,
claim that economic considerations support reinstating the death
penalty.261  The threat of the death penalty as a deterrent to violent
crime, in addition to savings procured when “guilty defendants
plead guilty to non-capital charges, rather than face . . . a capital
trial and possible execution,”262 create cost-saving mechanisms that
are unique to a death penalty regime.
The nationwide decline in the number of capital cases prose-
cuted is partly attributable to the great expense.263  Georgia re-
cently put seventy-two capital cases on hold because their public
defender program did not have adequate funds to conduct a
trial.264  And in October 2007, the New Mexico Supreme Court or-
dered a stay on a capital case until the legislature could allocate
more funding to public defenders.265  Compensation for New Mex-
ico’s state-provided defense counsel was found inadequate to en-
sure effective representation as required under the Sixth
Amendment.266
In addition, expenses resulting from the prosecution of capital
cases divert resources from crime prevention efforts, such as law
enforcement.  For example, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley,
who favors abolishing capital punishment in Maryland, claims re-
259. Stashenko, Capital Defender, supra note 4. R
260. Amanda S. Hitchcock, Using The Adversarial Process to Limit Arbitrariness in
Capital Charging Decisions, 85 N.C. L. REV. 931, 951 (2007) (citing Ashley Rupp,
Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and County Budgetary Restric-
tions:  Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County Funding?, 71 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2735, 2757 (2003) (noting that the exorbitant cost of capital trials may
force counties to choose between these prosecutions and more basic needs like addi-
tional law enforcement officers, public nursing positions, and public employee
raises)).
261. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 27. R
262. Id.
263. See Tanner, supra note 171. R
264. Tim Jones, Resistance to Death Penalty Growing:  Questions About Justice, Ex-
pense Undermining Political Support for Capital Punishment, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 8,
2007, at 21.
265. Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty out in Guard Killing, Inmates’ Defense Funds Fell
Short, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at C1.
266. See id.
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placing the death penalty with life without parole would free up
$22.4 million.267  Governor O’Malley stated that this amount could
be used to employ “500 additional police officers or provide drug
treatment for 10,000” people.268  O’Malley sees these expenditures
as preferable to the death penalty in terms of “sav[ing] lives and
prevent[ing] violent crime.”269
Based on a similar analysis, Colorado recently voted on a bill270
to abolish the death penalty and allocate the money saved from
capital prosecution and trials to investigate unsolved murder
cases.271  Proponents of this bill estimate savings of “$2 million a
year [currently] spent on prosecuting and defending death penalty
cases.”272  Reallocation of death penalty funds would also reduce
the incidence of unsolved murders.
Following this logic, if New York were to repeal its capital pun-
ishment statute, it could reallocate funds formerly used to prose-
cute capital cases to crime prevention programs.  Rather than
spend taxpayer money on reinstating the death penalty, abolition-
ists argue that these resources should be used to strengthen police
departments, fund crime-prevention programs,273 and improve
crime-detection techniques.274
6. Disparate Patterns of Prosecution
New York State prosecutors have complete discretion in decid-
ing when to seek the death penalty.275  Studies show disparate ap-
plication of the death penalty,276 suggesting arbitrary prosecutorial
267. Jones, Resistance, supra note 264. R
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. H.R. 1094, 2007 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2007).
271. See Steven K. Paulson, Colo. House Committee Votes to Abolish Death Pen-
alty, INDEPENDENT RECORD (Helena, MT), Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.helenair.com/
articles/2007/02/08/montana_top/000death.prt (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
272. Id.
273. Examples of such programs are domestic and gang violence prevention pro-
grams. See NEW YORKERS AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY, STATE SENATE VOTES
QUICK FIX FOR FLAWED DEATH PENALTY LAW (2007), http://www.nyadp.org/main/
70620statesen (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
274. Examples of such improvements include updating the DNA database and im-
proving on forensic methodology. Id.
275. Stephen B. Bright, Why the United States Will Join the Rest of the World in
Abandoning Capital Punishment, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 152, 163 (Hugo
Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004).
276. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER DUNN, THE DEATH PENALTY SKIPS ACROSS COUNTY
LINES, (2003), http://www.nyclu.org/node/815/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2007); Schoen-
berg, supra note 15, at 380-81 (“The New York Statute lacks guidelines regarding R
prosecutorial discretion, leaving prosecuting attorneys to decide whether to invoke
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decisions based on race, geography, and socio-economic factors.277
For example, since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1995,
twice as many capital cases could have been prosecuted in Manhat-
tan as in Queens, and yet Manhattan prosecutors have never
sought the death penalty, whereas those in Queens have sought
death in fourteen percent of death-eligible cases.278  This is just one
example.  A variable application of the law can be seen in the er-
ratic prosecutorial statistics across New York’s sixty-two coun-
ties.279  It appears, therefore, that the inclination of individual
prosecutors and varying prosecutorial practices between counties
create major discrepancies in the application of the death penalty
across the state.280
Death penalty proponents may say judicial review corrects for
any misconduct281 or that inconsistencies are a necessary byproduct
of our democratic system whereby prosecutors are elected and en-
trusted with pursuing only the most deserving cases.282  However,
the death penalty in their particular jurisdictions.  Thus, there is a strong argument
that the statute will and has been applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner.”).
277. See Editorial, Fatally Flawed:  Court Has Chance to End Debate on Unfair
Death Penalty Law, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2006, at A8.
278. Id.
279. See Testimony, supra note 179 (“[B]etween 1995 and 2003, upstate New York R
counties reported approximately 20% of all homicides in the state, but these counties
accounted for 65% of all capital prosecutions.  During that period, 6 of the 62 coun-
ties in New York State accounted for 56% of all death penalty cases.  Of the defend-
ants sentenced to death in New York State during this period, 43% were from Suffolk
County alone.  In other words, the decision to seek the death penalty in any particular
case in New York turned . . . on the county in which the crime occurred.”).
280. See generally Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and
the State Constitutional Validity of New York’s Death Penalty Statute—Two Questions,
59 ALB. L. REV. 1545, 1563 (1996) (“One inevitable consequence of unlimited
prosecutorial discretion is that the critical decisions whether to charge a defendant
with a capital crime . . . and seek the death penalty . . . will depend on the particular
philosophical, ethical, religious or other views of the individual prosecutor.”);
Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment:  A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 649, 668 (1996) (“The danger [of prosecutorial discretion is] . . . that
the prosecutor will be guided not by the appropriate legal considerations of a particu-
lar case but rather by extraneous pressures that should not influence the charging
decision as to whether to file for capital punishment.”);  Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing
the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective:  Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1811, 1813-14 (1998) (“With this prosecutorial freedom, however, comes the
danger that invidious considerations will prompt these death penalty decision
makers.”).
281. “Opponents of the death penalty frequently argue that innocent persons may
be killed however elaborate the appeals process.”  Wright, Life-Without-Parole, supra
note 255, at 558. R
282. See JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., supra note 19, at 11. R
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the inconsistent application of the 1995 death penalty law within
the state has led some to question whether a system where the
“happenstance of geography determines whether a defendant lives
or dies at the hands of the state” can be just.283
7. Questions of Innocence
Another argument frequently advanced for abolishing the death
penalty is the risk of executing an innocent person.  One hundred
and twenty-three prisoners across the United States were released
from death row between 1973 and 2006,284 with an average nine
years of incarceration before exoneration.285  Yet DNA testing
doesn’t render the criminal justice system foolproof.  DNA evi-
dence accounted for only fourteen of these releases.286  In the re-
maining cases, ultimate exoneration of death-sentenced prisoners
stemmed from other evidence such as confession by the true cul-
prit, the discovery that witness testimony was tainted or perjured,
and forensic evidence such as fingerprinting.287
These facts may potentially cut both ways.  For capital punish-
ment supporters, these statistics are evidence that innocence is de-
tected and corrective action taken by the system before it is too
late.288  In fact, death penalty advocates might argue that for the
sake of justice our system must risk occasionally punishing the in-
nocent.  Abolitionists, on the other hand, can cite these facts as
evidence that other innocent defendants falsely convicted and sen-
tenced to death were likely never detected.  Furthermore, most
would agree that the risk of depriving an innocent person of life
simply in order to execute the guilty is not a legitimate aim, espe-
cially when life imprisonment is an available alternative.
283. Fatally Flawed, supra note 277. R
284. Tanner, supra note 171; see also RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO R
CTR., INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS IN THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY (2004), http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=1149#Sec05b (last visited Sept.
22, 2008).  Between 1973 and 2004, 116 prisoners on death row had been exonerated.
Id.
285. Id.
286. Tanner, supra note 171; see also DIETER, supra note 284. R
287. DIETER, supra note 284. R
288. Economist Gary S. Becker and Judge Richard A. Posner argue that advances
in DNA identification and lengthy appeals processes protect against the risk of
wrongful execution. See Becker, supra note 197, at 3; Richard A. Posner, The Eco- R
nomics of Capital Punishment, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Feb. 2006, at 2, http://
www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss3/art3 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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8. Methods of Execution
In the past two years, the level of legal scrutiny over lethal injec-
tion has increased to the point where the method of execution is
arguably the most controversial issue in death penalty debate.  In
1977, the Oklahoma state medical examiner suggested an intrave-
nous drip consisting of a lethal combination of chemicals as a more
humane method of execution than the electric chair.289  The
Oklahoma Legislature approved the method that year.290  Since
then, thirty-six of the thirty-seven states to reinstate capital punish-
ment since 1976 and the federal government have adopted lethal
injection as the primary means of execution.291
Since the introduction of lethal injection, courts across the coun-
try have heard challenges to the administration, implementation,
and risk of error related to this method of execution.  On Septem-
ber 25, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in
Baze v. Rees,292 a civil lawsuit filed by Kentucky death row in-
mates, Ralph Baze and Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr., challenging
Kentucky’s lethal injection process as violating the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.293  The
Baze grant triggered nationwide stays on execution.  As of Septem-
289. See JAMIE FELLNER & SARAH TOFTE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SO LONG AS
THEY DIE:  LETHAL INJECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 13 (2006), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0406/us0406web.pdf; see also Brief for Petitioners at 4-7,
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439), 2007 WL 3307732, *4-7.
290. See FELLNER & TOFTE, supra note 289; see also Denno, supra note 166, at 65- R
71.
291. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996 BULLETIN tbl. 3
(1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp96.pdf.  Nebraska was the
exception, employing electrocution as the sole means of execution.  Although New
Jersey abolished its death penalty in 2007, while capital punishment was in effect the
state authorized lethal injection. See John Gramlich, Lethal Injection Moratorium In-
ches Closer, STATELINE, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/
story?contentId=249581 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).  Executions in New Jersey were
put on hold in 2004 by the Appellate Division of New Jersey’s Superior Court, finding
that the state’s Department of Corrections must review its lethal injection execution
procedures before carrying out any further executions and prove to the Court that
these procedures include protocol providing for a method by which to revive a pris-
oner when an execution goes wrong. See In re Readoption with Amendments of
Death Penalty Regulations, 842 A.2d 207, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
292. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), cert. granted, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct.
34 (2007); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439).
293. The Baze Petition asserts that the current method of lethal injection used in
Kentucky “creates the unnecessary risk of pain and suffering” because of the drugs
used and the methods in which these drugs are administered. See Brief for the Peti-
tioners, supra note 289, at 41; see also DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., U.S. SUPREME R
COURT DECISIONS:  2007-08 TERM, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&
did=2415 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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ber 25, 2007, the three-drug protocol at issue in Baze294 was used to
carry out lethal injections in thirty-six of the thirty-seven states that
allowed the death penalty.295  Stays of execution in twelve states,
either by governor or court order, were related to lethal injection
challenges.296  But only seven of the twelve state holds were in re-
sponse to the Baze grant; the other states’ doubts about the three-
drug protocol were sufficient to warrant stays even before the Baze
grant.297  The nationwide stays on execution resulted in the longest
hiatus on executions since Furman.298  In 2007, only forty-two ex-
ecutions took place nation-wide, the lowest in over a decade.299
On April 16, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling of
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, finding that neither the risk of
improper administration of the drug, nor the state’s failure to
adopt purportedly more humane alternatives, rendered the three-
294. The three drugs are sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 289, at 4-5.  This lethal injection R
protocol consists of the intravenous injection of three drugs:  first, an anesthetic, so-
dium thiopental, is administered, rendering the inmate unconscious; then, a para-
lyzing agent, pancuronium bromide; and finally, potassium chloride is injected, which
induces cardiac arrest and stops the heart. See Denno, supra note 166, at 55. R
295. At the time of the Baze petition, New Jersey was among the thirty-seven states
whose death penalty statute provided for the use of the three-drug protocol.  The New
Jersey death penalty was abolished on December 17, 2007. See supra notes 170 & 291.
Until February 2008, Nebraska was the only state in the country to carry out execu-
tions solely by the electric chair. See Gramlich, supra note 291.  In State v. Mata, the R
Nebraska Supreme Court held that electrocution violates the state constitution’s pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court upheld Mata’s death sentence,
finding the provision for the method of execution severable from the death penalty
statute.  Accordingly, Mata’s death sentence is stayed until the state legislature de-
vises a constitutional method of execution.  State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 261 (Neb.
2008).
296. The twelve states consisted of California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Nevada (whose status was unclear because executions were effectively halted
due to the lethal injection issue in Baze v. Rees), New Jersey, New Mexico (whose
status was unclear because the State Supreme Court ruled that legislature must allo-
cate more funds for indigent defense in capital cases), New York, North Carolina
(whose status was unclear because executions were effectively halted due to the lethal
injection issue in Baze v. Rees), Ohio (whose status was unclear because executions
were effectively halted due to the lethal injection issue in Baze v. Rees, although one
was allowed to proceed), and Tennessee (whose status unclear because executions
were effectively halted due to the lethal injection issue in Baze v. Rees, although one
was allowed to proceed and one volunteer execution was allowed).  See DEATH PEN-
ALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH PENALTY IN FLUX, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arti-
cle.php?did=2289 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008); see also Gramlich, supra note 291. R
297. Gramlich, supra note 291; see also Tanner, supra note 171. R
298. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
299. Thirty-one executions took place in 1994.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exetab.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
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drug protocol used for lethal injection by Kentucky cruel and unu-
sual punishment.300
III. RECOMMENDATION: ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER
THAN WORDS
This section evaluates the options of amending or abolishing the
New York death penalty.  The status quo is not acceptable.  Not
only should legislation reflect public opinion, but for practical pur-
poses, the legislature must not allow the death penalty statute to
remain a nullity.  The current political debate over capital punish-
ment shows greater support for abolition and more reasons to
abolish than amend New York’s death penalty statute.  This Note
therefore recommends that the legislature act to abolish the death
penalty.  If the majority of citizens decides that capital punishment
is still desirable, however, that decision must be reflected in func-
tioning state legislation.
A. Consequences of Inaction
The challenge of crafting a statute that will satisfy the Court of
Appeals’ exacting standards of due process is burdensome.301  In-
action might appeal to members of the New York Legislature who
oppose resurrecting the death penalty but do not want to deal with
the backlash they might face by attempting to definitively repeal
the statute.  If the Legislature is truly divided on this policy issue,
efforts to abolish may not seem worthwhile.  There are, however,
considerations that make it critical for the Legislature to ensure
that whether New York has or does not have a death penalty is the
decision of the legislature and not simply the result of judicial
review.
B. The Role of the Legislature
First, it is the legislature’s job, not that of the court, to decide
public policy.302  In finding CPL section 400.27(10) unconstitu-
300. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
301. In fact, continuation of the status quo is certainly a possibility and may be the
most likely prediction for New York, at least for the near future.  Assemblyman Jo-
seph Lentol predicts “there will never be an Assembly floor vote on this issue [of
reinstating the death penalty] . . . if we did anything, it would be nothing, and that
would kill the death penalty.”  Healy, supra note 257.  Further, according to Assem- R
blyman Ron Canestrari “[a] moratorium on the death penalty, or doing nothing to
restore it, seems the best way to go.’” Id.
302. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (“Courts . . . . are not designed
to be a good reflex of a democratic society. . . . Their essential quality is detachment,
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tional, the Court of Appeals did not find capital punishment un-
constitutional per se.  The LaValle Court simply held that because
one part of the statute, the deadlock provision, is unconstitutional
and cannot be severed from the whole, the legislature must enact
an amended version in order for the death penalty statute to
function.303
The situation in New York created by the death penalty statute’s
invalidation is not very different from that of abolition: death row
is closed, the Capital Defender Office is closed, and life without
parole is the maximum permissible sentence for a prisoner con-
victed of first-degree murder.304  There are, however, two critical
reasons that the status quo cannot continue.
C. Practical Consequences of Maintaining the Status Quo
1. Overruling LaValle
First, the Court of Appeals could ultimately gain enough new
members to overrule the LaValle decision.  If so, the death penalty
would suddenly return to force in New York State.  Now is the time
to decide what the public wants.  Rather than simply defer to judi-
cial decisions, the legislature must react.  If social values have
evolved to the point that the death penalty is no longer acceptable
to the public, the law should reflect this.
2. The Role of Consensus in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The second practical consideration mandating legislative action
is the role of consensus in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The
Eighth Amendment is based on “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”305  For Eighth
Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court sees state legislation as
the “clearest and most reliable objective” indication of these stan-
dards.306  To determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits
a certain practice, the Supreme Court often looks to state legisla-
tion to see whether a majority consensus about that practice has
developed among the states.307
founded on independence.”  (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
303. See People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 977 (N.Y. 2007).
304. See supra Part II.B.
305. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100-01 (1958)).
306. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 301, 331 (1989)).
307. Id. at 313.
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Even though New York does not currently have a functioning
death penalty statute, for purposes of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court might still examine the New York stat-
ute for an indication of political will.  In fact, the Court might rest
any determination of consensus on state legislation, reasoning that
the Legislature did not enact a new law because public opinion did
not warrant new legislation.308  Unfortunately, the statute on the
books in New York State no longer reflects a democratic consen-
sus.  In order for the Supreme Court to defer to the judgment of
the New York Legislature, as reflected in state legislation, that
judgment should be premised on reasoned deliberation and trans-
parency.  With regard to New York’s death penalty statute, this is
currently not the case.
D. Best Option for Amendment
It may be that the LaValle Court’s imposition of a death penalty
moratorium reflects the popular will.  If that is the case, and the
people of New York no longer support the death penalty, then the
Legislature must act to abolish this law.  If, on the other hand,
amendment is desirable, of the four options for amendment dis-
cussed above,309 Option 1 is most likely to receive approval from
the Court of Appeals.  First of all, this is the approach indicated by
members of the court on at least three occasions.310  Allowing a
capital jury to deliberate on two sentences, death and life without
parole, and instructing the jury that upon deadlock the defendant
will be sentenced to life without parole, is neither coercive, nor
unjust.  In New York, the capital trial can be seen as the govern-
ment’s case to win or lose.  If the government cannot convince all
twelve jurors that death is appropriate, it has lost its case, and so
the death penalty may not be used.  Deadlock means that the ju-
rors who voted for death rejected life without parole as too lenient,
and those who voted for life without parole rejected death as too
harsh.  No juror rejected life without parole as too harsh.311
The other three options discussed in Part II.A.2 are less likely to
be approved by the Court of Appeals.  Although Option 2312 im-
proves upon CPL section 400.27(10) by allowing the jury to con-
308. See id. at 326 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
309. See supra Part II.A.2.
310. See supra note 142. R
311. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 147-48, People v. LaValle, 817
N.E.2d 341, (N.Y. 2004) (No. 71), 2004 WL 1352004, at *147.
312. See supra Part II.A.2.b
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sider a parole-eligible sentence, it remains coercive because it
presents the danger that members of a potentially deadlocked jury
will vote for death in order to prevent the defendant’s parole eligi-
bility.  Whereas Option 3313 discards CPL section 400.27(10)’s coer-
cive parole-eligible deadlock sentence, it creates due process issues
by imposing life without parole upon deadlock even where most
jurors find sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a parole-
eligible sentence.  Although Option 4314 does not allow jurors to
impose a death sentence without unanimous agreement, the Court
of Appeals might find that the heightened need for reliability in a
capital case mandates against a sentencing scheme that allows a
deadlock sentence to be determined based on a non-unanimous
jury vote.  While no deadlock instruction should coerce a juror’s
vote, Option 4 goes too far in the opposite direction by increasing
the likelihood of and even encouraging jury deadlock.
New York places importance on giving the defendant the benefit
of the doubt, minimizing jury speculation and maximizing the
jury’s role in fashioning a sentence which is individualized and
fair.315  Option 1 provides an optimal mix of these considerations
by imposing the least severe sentence considered and encouraging
the jury to reach a unanimous verdict without fear of deadlock.
E. Abolition is Preferable to Amendment
The public hearings following the LaValle decision revealed a
general unwillingness to reinstate the death penalty in New
York.316  The costs of time and money in administering capital pun-
ishment seen in New York and nationwide seem too great, espe-
cially given the viability of life without parole as a replacement for
capital punishment.317  The following sections argue that abolishing
the death penalty in New York is preferable to amending the
statute.
1. Life Without Parole
In debates over the efficacy, efficiency, and expedience of capital
punishment, life without parole consistently emerges as a “legiti-
mate alternative to capital punishment embraced by either end of
313. See supra Part II.A.2.c
314. See supra Part II.A.2.d
315. See supra Part II.A.1.
316. See supra Part I.F.
317. See supra Part II.B.5.
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the political spectrum.”318  For death penalty opponents, life with-
out parole achieves the same goals as capital punishment, namely
deterrence and incapacitation.319  Death penalty advocates may
also accept life without parole as a satisfactory alternative to capi-
tal punishment.  Life without parole arguably serves as a marginal
deterrent to violent crime.320  Also, life imprisonment is less expen-
sive than the trial and appeals processes involved in capital punish-
ment.321  Most importantly, life without parole allows the
permanent incapacitation322 of the most dangerous criminals, but
can be reversed if a defendant is later proved innocent.323
2. The Federal Prosecution Loophole
While discussion of the federal death penalty is beyond the scope
of this paper, the prosecution of capital cases at the federal level in
New York influences the debate as to what action to take regarding
the New York State death penalty.  Assuming that the public con-
tinues to support the death penalty for certain crimes, the possibil-
ity that such crimes will be prosecuted and the death penalty
sought at the federal level may be an adequate alternative to a
state capital punishment statute.  State prosecutors could, in cer-
tain cases, cede jurisdiction to federal prosecutors who are author-
ized to seek capital punishment.  Federal prosecution might be
seen by law-enforcers, politicians, and the public alike as an ade-
quate remedy where they feel that the offender deserves the ulti-
mate punishment of death.324  Not everyone, however, will support
318. Wright, Life-Without-Parole, supra note 255, at 533. R
319. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. R
320. Cf. supra note 217. R
321. See supra Part II.B.5.
322. Wright, Life-Without-Parole, supra note 255, at 557. R
323. Id. at 558.
324. The use of federal prosecution of capital cases in New York, where state prose-
cutors are unable to pursue the death penalty, was seen most recently in the case of
Ronell Wilson.  Wilson was initially charged by the Richmond County District Attor-
ney’s Office, in the New York State Supreme Court in Staten Island, for the murder of
two local undercover police officers.  Following the LaValle decision, however, the
Richmond County D.A. ceded jurisdiction to the United States Attorney’s Office for
the Eastern District of New York to ensure that the death penalty was available. See
United States v. Ronell Wilson:  State Capital Defenders Assigned to Serve as Learned
Counsel in Death Penalty Case, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 2005, at col. 3; see also Press Re-
lease, Office of Dist. Attorney, Richmond County, Prepared Remarks of Richmond
County District Attorney Daniel M. Donovan, Jr. Regarding Federal Indictments of
Stapleton Crew (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://rcda.nyc.gov/pressreleases/2004/pr
112204.htm; Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Stapleton Crew Members Indicted
for Racketeering Charges Include Murder of Two Undercover Police Officers (Nov.
22, 2004), available at www.atf.gov/press/fy05press/field/112204ny_stapleton.pdf.  At-
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ceding cases to federal prosecutors in order to “achieve a specific
result.”325  Furthermore, the death penalty is rarely imposed by
federal juries in capital cases in New York.326
3. Public Opinion
In discussing the form an amended statute could take, it is im-
portant to remember that reinstating the death penalty is contin-
gent on support from both the legislature and the public.327  The
future of capital punishment in New York thus turns on the will of
the legislature and, more generally, the will of the people.  Reports
on public opinion and the relevant votes of the senate and assem-
bly on this issue suggest that today it is unlikely that legislation to
amend the death penalty could gain enough votes to reinstate the
death penalty.
Public opinion has changed since 1995.  The New York Assembly
Codes Committee’s report on the 2004-2005 public hearings about
New York’s death penalty revealed that many of the witnesses who
testified “favored non-restoration or outright abolishment of the
death penalty in New York.”328  This finding is consistent with a
public opinion poll published by the New York Times in February
2005 which reflected a decline in public support for capital
punishment:
Fifty-six percent of registered voters surveyed said they pre-
ferred either life in prison without parole or life in prison with
the possibility of parole over the death penalty for people con-
victed of murder. Only 34 percent said they supported the death
penalty, a significant drop from the 47 percent who supported it
in 1994 when Mr. Pataki made instituting the death penalty a
torney General Gonzalez ordered the U.S. Attorney to seek the death penalty against
Wilson, and a federal jury sentenced Wilson to death. See SUSAN SCHINDLER, THE
DEATH PENALTY TRUMP CARD:  U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL (2007), http://www.ny-
adp.org/main/enews605 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008); Robert Blecker, But Did They
Listen?  The New Jersey Death Penalty Commission’s Exercise in Abolitionism:  A De-
tailed Reply 39 (N.Y. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 07/08-1, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002434.
325. Annese, supra note 204.  As former District Attorney William L. Murphy said: R
“We have to operate under the laws within the state of New York.” Id.
326. See Schindler, supra note 324 (“In the 13 death eligible cases where a Federal R
jury in New York convicted the defendant, the jury refused to vote for a death
sentence.”).
327. See Zimet, Valid Deadlock Instruction, supra note 128. R
328. Murphy, Cahill, supra note 113, at 1049; see generally JOSEPH LENTOL ET AL., R
supra note 19. R
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critical component of his successful drive to unseat Gov. Mario
M. Cuomo.329
More recently a 2006 poll showed that fifty-three percent of New
Yorkers said they preferred life without parole, while thirty-eight
percent supported the death penalty in first degree murder cases.330
4. Legislative Will
The change in public support for the death penalty is reflected
within the legislature.  It is important to look to the actions taken
by the state legislature, which the Supreme Court upholds as “the
best objective indicia of public attitude.”331  Although public opin-
ion polls can be useful, their conclusions can be easily misconstrued
and altered depending on the questions selected, the form of these
questions, the method of participant selection, the sample size, and
other factors.  The acts of our democratically elected representa-
tives express the “will and consequently the moral values of the
people.”332
Just as public support for the death penalty has changed since
1995, so has opinion shifted within the legislature.  Several mem-
bers of the New York State Legislature who once supported the
passage of a death penalty law in New York have since reconsid-
ered their positions.  For example, New York State Assem-
blywoman Helen E. Weinstein, who was elected to the New York
Assembly in 1980 as a death penalty proponent and who voted to
enact the death penalty in 1995, decided not to support reenacting
the death penalty after the LaValle decision.  Weinstein reasoned
“you cannot draft a death penalty law that does not have the possi-
bility of convicting someone who is innocent.”333  Similarly, Assem-
blyman Joseph Lentol, who is chairman of the Assembly’s Codes
Committee that held public death penalty hearings in 2004 and
2005, also reversed his previous support for capital punishment.334
Lentol, like Weinstein, concluded that the death penalty is too
329. Slackman & Connelly, supra note 116 (“The poll, of 1,822 people . . . had a R
margin of sampling error of plus or minus three percentage points and surveyed 1,481
people who said they were registered to vote.”).
330. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (follow “New
York” hyperlink, located halfway down initial chart) (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
331. Proctor, Reevaluating, supra note 176, at 229-30. R
332. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972)).
333. Sam Roberts, Switch by a Former Supporter Shows Evolution of Death Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at B1.
334. Stashenko, supra note 108. R
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flawed: “I thought of the law as majestic and that there was very
little chance of a mistake . . . . [b]ut I’ve come to realize that no
one’s perfect, including judges and juries.”335  According to Assem-
blyman Ron Canestrari of Albany County, who has also withdrawn
his support for the 1995 death penalty statute, “there’s very little
evidence the death penalty has helped New York these 10
years.”336  There seems to be a consensus, at least among members
of the assembly, that whatever purposes the death penalty was sup-
posed to serve, they are not served by the current system.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has ruled that capital punishment is not an
intrinsic violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment.337  Given that the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional, the decision to have a death penalty rests with the
legislature.  The Supreme Court has recognized that “the constitu-
tional test [of a capital punishment statute] is intertwined with an
assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment
weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards.”338  Accordingly, it is
a legislature’s responsibility to pass laws that “respond to the will
and . . . the moral values of the people.”339  In New York, votes in
the legislature about the death penalty are often close, reflecting
the closely divided opinion of the public.  Shifting positions taken
by the state legislature mirror shifting public views.340  The state
legislature is in the best position to communicate its citizens’ deter-
mination as to the future of capital punishment in New York.
The United States legislative system’s assignment of this respon-
sibility to its political representatives has been identified as the
method most likely to result in laws that express the will of the
electorate.  The Supreme Court therefore “relies on legislative acts
335. Michael Powell, N.Y. Lawmakers Vote not to Reinstate Capital Punishment,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A3.
336. Healy, supra note 257. R
337. The Supreme Court has consistently held that capital punishment is not in
itself a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, but that certain applica-
tions of the death penalty have been.  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court upheld capital
punishment and refused to hold that it is per se “cruel and unusual punishment,”
effectively ending the debate, started just four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, as
to capital punishment’s constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment. See Gregg,
428 U.S. at 153; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
338. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
339. Id.
340. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
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. . . when it attempts to gauge American public opinion about the
death penalty.”341
Given the complex mixture of morals, ethics, questions of effec-
tiveness, questions of equal protection, questions of spending on
the death penalty versus spending on prevention, and the intricate
swirl of conflicting emotions and personal convictions about this
difficult and contentious subject, abolishing the death penalty
seems most appropriate.  New York’s death penalty statute, CPL
section 400.27, rendered inoperable by the Court of Appeals, no
longer reflects the results of a reasoned democratic consensus.  If
capital punishment is no longer a desirable or practical option for
New York, the legislature must act to affirmatively abolish the
statute.
As Judge Smith observed in his Taylor concurrence, by acting to
either amend or repeal the death penalty statute, the legislature
“would bring the capital punishment issue back into the realm of
democratic decision-making, where it belongs.”342 This decision
should reside with the legislature.
341. Proctor, Reevaluating, supra note 176, at 213 n.16 (“Although poll results are R
closer to the primary source and thus intuitively reliable, the Court identifies legisla-
tive acts as the most objective, dependable indicator of national consensus.”).
342. People v. Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 987 (N.Y. 2007) (Smith, J., concurring).
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